?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
[PATCH] keys: sort out key quota system
[wrt350n-kernel.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob13384fef0d608e65bc43e8619a7205c8cf89b0e9
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
32 #include <linux/mm.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/kd.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
49 #include <net/icmp.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
72
73 #include "avc.h"
74 #include "objsec.h"
75 #include "netif.h"
76 #include "xfrm.h"
77
78 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
79 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
80
81 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
82 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
83 extern int selinux_compat_net;
84
85 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
86 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
87
88 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
89 {
90 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
91 return 1;
92 }
93 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
94 #endif
95
96 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
97 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
98
99 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
100 {
101 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
102 return 1;
103 }
104 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
105 #else
106 int selinux_enabled = 1;
107 #endif
108
109 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
110 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
111
112 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
113 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
114 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
115 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
116 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
117
118 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
119 before the policy was loaded. */
120 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
121 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
122
123 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
124
125 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
126 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
127 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
128 {
129 char *context;
130 unsigned len;
131 int rc;
132
133 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
134 if (rc)
135 return rc;
136
137 if (!buffer || !size)
138 goto getsecurity_exit;
139
140 if (size < len) {
141 len = -ERANGE;
142 goto getsecurity_exit;
143 }
144 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
145
146 getsecurity_exit:
147 kfree(context);
148 return len;
149 }
150
151 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
152
153 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
154 {
155 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156
157 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 if (!tsec)
159 return -ENOMEM;
160
161 tsec->task = task;
162 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
163 task->security = tsec;
164
165 return 0;
166 }
167
168 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
169 {
170 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
171 task->security = NULL;
172 kfree(tsec);
173 }
174
175 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
176 {
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
178 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
179
180 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
181 if (!isec)
182 return -ENOMEM;
183
184 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
185 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
186 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
187 isec->inode = inode;
188 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
189 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
190 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
191 inode->i_security = isec;
192
193 return 0;
194 }
195
196 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
197 {
198 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
199 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
200
201 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
202 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
203 list_del_init(&isec->list);
204 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205
206 inode->i_security = NULL;
207 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
208 }
209
210 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
211 {
212 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
213 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
214
215 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
216 if (!fsec)
217 return -ENOMEM;
218
219 fsec->file = file;
220 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
221 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
222 file->f_security = fsec;
223
224 return 0;
225 }
226
227 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
228 {
229 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
230 file->f_security = NULL;
231 kfree(fsec);
232 }
233
234 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
235 {
236 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
237
238 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
239 if (!sbsec)
240 return -ENOMEM;
241
242 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
243 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
244 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
245 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
246 sbsec->sb = sb;
247 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
248 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
249 sb->s_security = sbsec;
250
251 return 0;
252 }
253
254 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
255 {
256 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
257
258 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
259 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
260 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
261 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
262
263 sb->s_security = NULL;
264 kfree(sbsec);
265 }
266
267 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
268 {
269 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
270
271 if (family != PF_UNIX)
272 return 0;
273
274 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 if (!ssec)
276 return -ENOMEM;
277
278 ssec->sk = sk;
279 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 sk->sk_security = ssec;
281
282 return 0;
283 }
284
285 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
286 {
287 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
288
289 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
290 return;
291
292 sk->sk_security = NULL;
293 kfree(ssec);
294 }
295
296 /* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298 extern int ss_initialized;
299
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
301
302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
303 "uses xattr",
304 "uses transition SIDs",
305 "uses task SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
309 };
310
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
312
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
314 {
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
316 }
317
318 enum {
319 Opt_context = 1,
320 Opt_fscontext = 2,
321 Opt_defcontext = 4,
322 };
323
324 static match_table_t tokens = {
325 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
326 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
327 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
328 };
329
330 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
331
332 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
333 {
334 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
335 const char *name;
336 u32 sid;
337 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
340
341 if (!data)
342 goto out;
343
344 name = sb->s_type->name;
345
346 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
347
348 /* NFS we understand. */
349 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
350 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
351
352 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
353 goto out;
354
355 if (d->context[0]) {
356 context = d->context;
357 seen |= Opt_context;
358 }
359 } else
360 goto out;
361
362 } else {
363 /* Standard string-based options. */
364 char *p, *options = data;
365
366 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
367 int token;
368 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
369
370 if (!*p)
371 continue;
372
373 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
374
375 switch (token) {
376 case Opt_context:
377 if (seen) {
378 rc = -EINVAL;
379 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
380 goto out_free;
381 }
382 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
383 if (!context) {
384 rc = -ENOMEM;
385 goto out_free;
386 }
387 if (!alloc)
388 alloc = 1;
389 seen |= Opt_context;
390 break;
391
392 case Opt_fscontext:
393 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
394 rc = -EINVAL;
395 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
396 goto out_free;
397 }
398 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
399 if (!context) {
400 rc = -ENOMEM;
401 goto out_free;
402 }
403 if (!alloc)
404 alloc = 1;
405 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
406 break;
407
408 case Opt_defcontext:
409 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 rc = -EINVAL;
411 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
412 "defcontext option is invalid "
413 "for this filesystem type\n");
414 goto out_free;
415 }
416 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
417 rc = -EINVAL;
418 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
419 goto out_free;
420 }
421 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
422 if (!defcontext) {
423 rc = -ENOMEM;
424 goto out_free;
425 }
426 if (!alloc)
427 alloc = 1;
428 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
429 break;
430
431 default:
432 rc = -EINVAL;
433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
434 "option\n");
435 goto out_free;
436
437 }
438 }
439 }
440
441 if (!seen)
442 goto out;
443
444 if (context) {
445 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
446 if (rc) {
447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
448 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
449 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
450 goto out_free;
451 }
452
453 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
454 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
455 if (rc)
456 goto out_free;
457
458 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
459 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
460 if (rc)
461 goto out_free;
462
463 sbsec->sid = sid;
464
465 if (seen & Opt_context)
466 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
467 }
468
469 if (defcontext) {
470 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
471 if (rc) {
472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
473 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
474 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
475 goto out_free;
476 }
477
478 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
479 goto out_free;
480
481 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
482 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
483 if (rc)
484 goto out_free;
485
486 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
487 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490
491 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
492 }
493
494 out_free:
495 if (alloc) {
496 kfree(context);
497 kfree(defcontext);
498 }
499 out:
500 return rc;
501 }
502
503 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
504 {
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
508 int rc = 0;
509
510 down(&sbsec->sem);
511 if (sbsec->initialized)
512 goto out;
513
514 if (!ss_initialized) {
515 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
516 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
517 server is ready to handle calls. */
518 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
519 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
520 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
521 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
522 goto out;
523 }
524
525 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
526 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
527 if (rc) {
528 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
529 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
530 goto out;
531 }
532
533 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
534 if (rc)
535 goto out;
536
537 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
538 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
539 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
540 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
541 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
542 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
543 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
544 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
545 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
546 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
547 goto out;
548 }
549 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
550 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
551 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
552 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
553 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
554 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
555 else
556 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
557 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
558 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
559 goto out;
560 }
561 }
562
563 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
564 sbsec->proc = 1;
565
566 sbsec->initialized = 1;
567
568 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
569 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
570 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
571 }
572 else {
573 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
574 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
575 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
576 }
577
578 /* Initialize the root inode. */
579 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
580
581 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
582 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
583 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
584 populates itself. */
585 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
586 next_inode:
587 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
588 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
589 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
590 struct inode_security_struct, list);
591 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
592 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
593 inode = igrab(inode);
594 if (inode) {
595 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
596 inode_doinit(inode);
597 iput(inode);
598 }
599 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 list_del_init(&isec->list);
601 goto next_inode;
602 }
603 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
604 out:
605 up(&sbsec->sem);
606 return rc;
607 }
608
609 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
610 {
611 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
612 case S_IFSOCK:
613 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
614 case S_IFLNK:
615 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
616 case S_IFREG:
617 return SECCLASS_FILE;
618 case S_IFBLK:
619 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
620 case S_IFDIR:
621 return SECCLASS_DIR;
622 case S_IFCHR:
623 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
624 case S_IFIFO:
625 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
626
627 }
628
629 return SECCLASS_FILE;
630 }
631
632 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
633 {
634 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
635 }
636
637 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
638 {
639 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
640 }
641
642 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
643 {
644 switch (family) {
645 case PF_UNIX:
646 switch (type) {
647 case SOCK_STREAM:
648 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
649 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
650 case SOCK_DGRAM:
651 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
652 }
653 break;
654 case PF_INET:
655 case PF_INET6:
656 switch (type) {
657 case SOCK_STREAM:
658 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
659 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
660 else
661 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
662 case SOCK_DGRAM:
663 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
664 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
665 else
666 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
667 default:
668 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
669 }
670 break;
671 case PF_NETLINK:
672 switch (protocol) {
673 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
675 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
677 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
679 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
680 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
681 case NETLINK_XFRM:
682 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
683 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
684 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
685 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
686 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
687 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
688 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
689 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
690 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
691 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
692 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
693 default:
694 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
695 }
696 case PF_PACKET:
697 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
698 case PF_KEY:
699 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
700 case PF_APPLETALK:
701 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
702 }
703
704 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
705 }
706
707 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
708 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
709 u16 tclass,
710 u32 *sid)
711 {
712 int buflen, rc;
713 char *buffer, *path, *end;
714
715 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
716 if (!buffer)
717 return -ENOMEM;
718
719 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
720 end = buffer+buflen;
721 *--end = '\0';
722 buflen--;
723 path = end-1;
724 *path = '/';
725 while (de && de != de->parent) {
726 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
727 if (buflen < 0)
728 break;
729 end -= de->namelen;
730 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
731 *--end = '/';
732 path = end;
733 de = de->parent;
734 }
735 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
736 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
737 return rc;
738 }
739 #else
740 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
741 u16 tclass,
742 u32 *sid)
743 {
744 return -EINVAL;
745 }
746 #endif
747
748 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
749 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
750 {
751 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
752 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
753 u32 sid;
754 struct dentry *dentry;
755 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
756 char *context = NULL;
757 unsigned len = 0;
758 int rc = 0;
759 int hold_sem = 0;
760
761 if (isec->initialized)
762 goto out;
763
764 down(&isec->sem);
765 hold_sem = 1;
766 if (isec->initialized)
767 goto out;
768
769 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
770 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
771 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
772 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
773 server is ready to handle calls. */
774 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
775 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
776 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
777 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
778 goto out;
779 }
780
781 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
782 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
783 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
784 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
785 break;
786 }
787
788 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
789 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
790 if (opt_dentry) {
791 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
792 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
793 } else {
794 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
795 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
796 }
797 if (!dentry) {
798 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
799 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
800 inode->i_ino);
801 goto out;
802 }
803
804 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
805 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
806 if (!context) {
807 rc = -ENOMEM;
808 dput(dentry);
809 goto out;
810 }
811 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
812 context, len);
813 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
814 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
815 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
816 NULL, 0);
817 if (rc < 0) {
818 dput(dentry);
819 goto out;
820 }
821 kfree(context);
822 len = rc;
823 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
824 if (!context) {
825 rc = -ENOMEM;
826 dput(dentry);
827 goto out;
828 }
829 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
830 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
831 context, len);
832 }
833 dput(dentry);
834 if (rc < 0) {
835 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
836 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
837 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
838 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
839 kfree(context);
840 goto out;
841 }
842 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
843 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
844 rc = 0;
845 } else {
846 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
847 sbsec->def_sid);
848 if (rc) {
849 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
850 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
851 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
852 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
853 kfree(context);
854 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
855 rc = 0;
856 break;
857 }
858 }
859 kfree(context);
860 isec->sid = sid;
861 break;
862 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
863 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
864 break;
865 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
866 /* Default to the fs SID. */
867 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
868
869 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
870 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
871 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
872 sbsec->sid,
873 isec->sclass,
874 &sid);
875 if (rc)
876 goto out;
877 isec->sid = sid;
878 break;
879 default:
880 /* Default to the fs SID. */
881 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
882
883 if (sbsec->proc) {
884 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
885 if (proci->pde) {
886 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
887 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
888 isec->sclass,
889 &sid);
890 if (rc)
891 goto out;
892 isec->sid = sid;
893 }
894 }
895 break;
896 }
897
898 isec->initialized = 1;
899
900 out:
901 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
902 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
903
904 if (hold_sem)
905 up(&isec->sem);
906 return rc;
907 }
908
909 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
910 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
911 {
912 u32 perm = 0;
913
914 switch (sig) {
915 case SIGCHLD:
916 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
917 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
918 break;
919 case SIGKILL:
920 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
921 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
922 break;
923 case SIGSTOP:
924 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
925 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
926 break;
927 default:
928 /* All other signals. */
929 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
930 break;
931 }
932
933 return perm;
934 }
935
936 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
937 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
938 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
939 struct task_struct *tsk2,
940 u32 perms)
941 {
942 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
943
944 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
945 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
946 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
947 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
948 }
949
950 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
951 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
952 int cap)
953 {
954 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
955 struct avc_audit_data ad;
956
957 tsec = tsk->security;
958
959 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
960 ad.tsk = tsk;
961 ad.u.cap = cap;
962
963 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
964 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
965 }
966
967 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
968 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
969 u32 perms)
970 {
971 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
972
973 tsec = tsk->security;
974
975 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
976 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
977 }
978
979 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
980 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
981 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
982 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
983 struct inode *inode,
984 u32 perms,
985 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
986 {
987 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
988 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
989 struct avc_audit_data ad;
990
991 tsec = tsk->security;
992 isec = inode->i_security;
993
994 if (!adp) {
995 adp = &ad;
996 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
997 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
998 }
999
1000 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1001 }
1002
1003 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1004 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1005 pathname if needed. */
1006 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1007 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1008 struct dentry *dentry,
1009 u32 av)
1010 {
1011 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1012 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1013 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1014 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1015 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1016 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1017 }
1018
1019 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1020 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1021 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1022 check a particular permission to the file.
1023 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1024 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1025 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1026 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1027 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1028 struct file *file,
1029 u32 av)
1030 {
1031 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1032 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1033 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1034 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1035 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1036 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1037 int rc;
1038
1039 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1040 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1041 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1042
1043 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1044 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1045 SECCLASS_FD,
1046 FD__USE,
1047 &ad);
1048 if (rc)
1049 return rc;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1053 if (av)
1054 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1055
1056 return 0;
1057 }
1058
1059 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1060 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1061 struct dentry *dentry,
1062 u16 tclass)
1063 {
1064 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1065 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1066 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1067 u32 newsid;
1068 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1069 int rc;
1070
1071 tsec = current->security;
1072 dsec = dir->i_security;
1073 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1074
1075 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1076 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1077
1078 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1079 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1080 &ad);
1081 if (rc)
1082 return rc;
1083
1084 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1085 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1086 } else {
1087 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1088 &newsid);
1089 if (rc)
1090 return rc;
1091 }
1092
1093 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1094 if (rc)
1095 return rc;
1096
1097 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1098 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1099 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1100 }
1101
1102 #define MAY_LINK 0
1103 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1104 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1105
1106 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1107 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1108 struct dentry *dentry,
1109 int kind)
1110
1111 {
1112 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1113 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1114 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1115 u32 av;
1116 int rc;
1117
1118 tsec = current->security;
1119 dsec = dir->i_security;
1120 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1121
1122 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1123 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1124
1125 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1126 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1127 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1128 if (rc)
1129 return rc;
1130
1131 switch (kind) {
1132 case MAY_LINK:
1133 av = FILE__LINK;
1134 break;
1135 case MAY_UNLINK:
1136 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1137 break;
1138 case MAY_RMDIR:
1139 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1140 break;
1141 default:
1142 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1143 return 0;
1144 }
1145
1146 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1147 return rc;
1148 }
1149
1150 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1151 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1152 struct inode *new_dir,
1153 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1154 {
1155 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1156 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1157 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1158 u32 av;
1159 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1160 int rc;
1161
1162 tsec = current->security;
1163 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1164 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1165 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1166 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1167
1168 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1169
1170 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1172 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1173 if (rc)
1174 return rc;
1175 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1176 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1177 if (rc)
1178 return rc;
1179 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1180 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1181 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1182 if (rc)
1183 return rc;
1184 }
1185
1186 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1187 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1188 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1189 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1190 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1191 if (rc)
1192 return rc;
1193 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1194 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1195 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1196 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1197 new_isec->sclass,
1198 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1199 if (rc)
1200 return rc;
1201 }
1202
1203 return 0;
1204 }
1205
1206 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1207 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1208 struct super_block *sb,
1209 u32 perms,
1210 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1211 {
1212 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1213 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1214
1215 tsec = tsk->security;
1216 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1217 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1218 perms, ad);
1219 }
1220
1221 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1222 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1223 {
1224 u32 av = 0;
1225
1226 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1227 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1228 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1229 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1230 av |= FILE__READ;
1231
1232 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1233 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1234 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1235 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1236
1237 } else {
1238 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1239 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1240 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1241 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1242 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1243 av |= DIR__READ;
1244 }
1245
1246 return av;
1247 }
1248
1249 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1250 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1251 {
1252 u32 av = 0;
1253
1254 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1255 av |= FILE__READ;
1256 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1257 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1258 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1259 else
1260 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1261 }
1262
1263 return av;
1264 }
1265
1266 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1267 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1268 {
1269 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1271
1272 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1273 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1274 return 0;
1275 }
1276
1277 down(&isec->sem);
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 isec->sid = sid;
1280 isec->initialized = 1;
1281 up(&isec->sem);
1282 return 0;
1283 }
1284
1285 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1286
1287 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1288 {
1289 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1290 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1291 int rc;
1292
1293 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1294 if (rc)
1295 return rc;
1296
1297 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1298 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1299 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1300 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1301 return rc;
1302 }
1303
1304 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1305 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1306 {
1307 int error;
1308
1309 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1310 if (error)
1311 return error;
1312
1313 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1314 }
1315
1316 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1317 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1318 {
1319 int error;
1320
1321 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1322 if (error)
1323 return error;
1324
1325 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1326 }
1327
1328 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1329 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1330 {
1331 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1332 }
1333
1334 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1335 {
1336 int rc;
1337
1338 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1339 if (rc)
1340 return rc;
1341
1342 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1343 }
1344
1345 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1346 {
1347 int error = 0;
1348 u32 av;
1349 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1350 u32 tsid;
1351 int rc;
1352
1353 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1354 if (rc)
1355 return rc;
1356
1357 tsec = current->security;
1358
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1360 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1361 if (rc) {
1362 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1363 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1364 }
1365
1366 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1367 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1368 if(op == 001) {
1369 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1370 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1371 } else {
1372 av = 0;
1373 if (op & 004)
1374 av |= FILE__READ;
1375 if (op & 002)
1376 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1377 if (av)
1378 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1379 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1380 }
1381
1382 return error;
1383 }
1384
1385 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1386 {
1387 int rc = 0;
1388
1389 if (!sb)
1390 return 0;
1391
1392 switch (cmds) {
1393 case Q_SYNC:
1394 case Q_QUOTAON:
1395 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1396 case Q_SETINFO:
1397 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1398 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1399 sb,
1400 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1401 break;
1402 case Q_GETFMT:
1403 case Q_GETINFO:
1404 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1405 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1406 sb,
1407 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1408 break;
1409 default:
1410 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1411 break;
1412 }
1413 return rc;
1414 }
1415
1416 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1417 {
1418 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1419 }
1420
1421 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1422 {
1423 int rc;
1424
1425 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1426 if (rc)
1427 return rc;
1428
1429 switch (type) {
1430 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1431 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1432 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1433 break;
1434 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1435 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1436 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1437 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1438 break;
1439 case 0: /* Close log */
1440 case 1: /* Open log */
1441 case 2: /* Read from log */
1442 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1443 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1444 default:
1445 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1446 break;
1447 }
1448 return rc;
1449 }
1450
1451 /*
1452 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1453 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1454 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1455 *
1456 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1457 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1458 * the capability is granted.
1459 *
1460 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1461 * processes that allocate mappings.
1462 */
1463 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1464 {
1465 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1466 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1467
1468 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1469 if (rc == 0)
1470 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1471 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1472 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1473 NULL);
1474
1475 if (rc == 0)
1476 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1477
1478 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1479 }
1480
1481 /* binprm security operations */
1482
1483 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1484 {
1485 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1486
1487 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1488 if (!bsec)
1489 return -ENOMEM;
1490
1491 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1492 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1493 bsec->set = 0;
1494
1495 bprm->security = bsec;
1496 return 0;
1497 }
1498
1499 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1500 {
1501 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1502 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1503 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1504 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1505 u32 newsid;
1506 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1507 int rc;
1508
1509 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1510 if (rc)
1511 return rc;
1512
1513 bsec = bprm->security;
1514
1515 if (bsec->set)
1516 return 0;
1517
1518 tsec = current->security;
1519 isec = inode->i_security;
1520
1521 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1522 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1523
1524 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1525 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1526
1527 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1528 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1529 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1530 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1531 } else {
1532 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1533 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1534 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1535 if (rc)
1536 return rc;
1537 }
1538
1539 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1540 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1541 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1542
1543 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1544 newsid = tsec->sid;
1545
1546 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1547 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1548 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1549 if (rc)
1550 return rc;
1551 } else {
1552 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1553 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1554 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1555 if (rc)
1556 return rc;
1557
1558 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1559 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1560 if (rc)
1561 return rc;
1562
1563 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1564 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1565
1566 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1567 bsec->sid = newsid;
1568 }
1569
1570 bsec->set = 1;
1571 return 0;
1572 }
1573
1574 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1575 {
1576 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1577 }
1578
1579
1580 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1581 {
1582 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1583 int atsecure = 0;
1584
1585 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1586 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1587 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1588 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1589 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1590 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1591 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1592 }
1593
1594 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1595 }
1596
1597 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1598 {
1599 kfree(bprm->security);
1600 bprm->security = NULL;
1601 }
1602
1603 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1604 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1605
1606 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1607 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1608 {
1609 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1610 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1611 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1612 struct fdtable *fdt;
1613 long j = -1;
1614
1615 if (tty) {
1616 file_list_lock();
1617 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1618 if (file) {
1619 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1620 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1621 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1622 file may belong to another process and we are only
1623 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1624 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1625 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1626 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1627 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1628 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1629 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1630 }
1631 }
1632 file_list_unlock();
1633 }
1634
1635 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1636
1637 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1638
1639 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1640 for (;;) {
1641 unsigned long set, i;
1642 int fd;
1643
1644 j++;
1645 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1646 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1647 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1648 break;
1649 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1650 if (!set)
1651 continue;
1652 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1653 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1654 if (set & 1) {
1655 file = fget(i);
1656 if (!file)
1657 continue;
1658 if (file_has_perm(current,
1659 file,
1660 file_to_av(file))) {
1661 sys_close(i);
1662 fd = get_unused_fd();
1663 if (fd != i) {
1664 if (fd >= 0)
1665 put_unused_fd(fd);
1666 fput(file);
1667 continue;
1668 }
1669 if (devnull) {
1670 get_file(devnull);
1671 } else {
1672 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1673 if (!devnull) {
1674 put_unused_fd(fd);
1675 fput(file);
1676 continue;
1677 }
1678 }
1679 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1680 }
1681 fput(file);
1682 }
1683 }
1684 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1685
1686 }
1687 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1688 }
1689
1690 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1691 {
1692 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1693 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1694 u32 sid;
1695 int rc;
1696
1697 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1698
1699 tsec = current->security;
1700
1701 bsec = bprm->security;
1702 sid = bsec->sid;
1703
1704 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1705 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1706 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1707 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1708 unchanged and kill. */
1709 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1710 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1711 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1712 if (rc) {
1713 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1714 return;
1715 }
1716 }
1717
1718 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1719 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1720 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1721 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1722 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1723 NULL);
1724 if (rc) {
1725 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1726 return;
1727 }
1728 }
1729 tsec->sid = sid;
1730 }
1731 }
1732
1733 /*
1734 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1735 */
1736 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1737 {
1738 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1739 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1740 struct itimerval itimer;
1741 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1742 int rc, i;
1743
1744 tsec = current->security;
1745 bsec = bprm->security;
1746
1747 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1748 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1749 return;
1750 }
1751 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1752 return;
1753
1754 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1755 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1756
1757 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1758 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1759 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1760 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1761 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1762 will be checked against the new SID. */
1763 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1764 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1765 if (rc) {
1766 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1767 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1768 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1769 flush_signals(current);
1770 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1771 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1772 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1773 recalc_sigpending();
1774 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1775 }
1776
1777 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1778 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1779 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1780 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1781 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1782 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1783 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1784 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1785 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1786 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1787 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1788 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1789 if (rc) {
1790 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1791 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1792 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1793 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1794 }
1795 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1796 /*
1797 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1798 * to be refigured.
1799 */
1800 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1801 }
1802 }
1803
1804 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1805 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1806 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1807 }
1808
1809 /* superblock security operations */
1810
1811 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1812 {
1813 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1814 }
1815
1816 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1817 {
1818 superblock_free_security(sb);
1819 }
1820
1821 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1822 {
1823 if (plen > olen)
1824 return 0;
1825
1826 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1827 }
1828
1829 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1830 {
1831 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1832 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1833 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1834 }
1835
1836 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1837 {
1838 if (!*first) {
1839 **to = ',';
1840 *to += 1;
1841 }
1842 else
1843 *first = 0;
1844 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1845 *to += len;
1846 }
1847
1848 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1849 {
1850 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1851 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1852 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1853
1854 in_curr = orig;
1855 sec_curr = copy;
1856
1857 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1858 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1859 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1860 goto out;
1861 }
1862
1863 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1864 if (!nosec) {
1865 rc = -ENOMEM;
1866 goto out;
1867 }
1868
1869 nosec_save = nosec;
1870 fnosec = fsec = 1;
1871 in_save = in_end = orig;
1872
1873 do {
1874 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1875 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1876
1877 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1878 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1879 else
1880 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1881
1882 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1883 }
1884 } while (*in_end++);
1885
1886 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1887 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1888 out:
1889 return rc;
1890 }
1891
1892 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1893 {
1894 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1895 int rc;
1896
1897 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1898 if (rc)
1899 return rc;
1900
1901 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1902 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1903 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1904 }
1905
1906 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
1907 {
1908 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1909
1910 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1911 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
1912 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1913 }
1914
1915 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1916 struct nameidata *nd,
1917 char * type,
1918 unsigned long flags,
1919 void * data)
1920 {
1921 int rc;
1922
1923 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1924 if (rc)
1925 return rc;
1926
1927 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1928 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1929 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1930 else
1931 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1932 FILE__MOUNTON);
1933 }
1934
1935 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1936 {
1937 int rc;
1938
1939 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1940 if (rc)
1941 return rc;
1942
1943 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1944 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1945 }
1946
1947 /* inode security operations */
1948
1949 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1950 {
1951 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1952 }
1953
1954 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1955 {
1956 inode_free_security(inode);
1957 }
1958
1959 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1960 char **name, void **value,
1961 size_t *len)
1962 {
1963 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1964 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1965 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1966 u32 newsid, clen;
1967 int rc;
1968 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1969
1970 tsec = current->security;
1971 dsec = dir->i_security;
1972 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1973
1974 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1975 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1976 } else {
1977 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1978 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1979 &newsid);
1980 if (rc) {
1981 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1982 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1983 "ino=%ld)\n",
1984 __FUNCTION__,
1985 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1986 return rc;
1987 }
1988 }
1989
1990 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1991
1992 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
1993 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1994
1995 if (name) {
1996 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
1997 if (!namep)
1998 return -ENOMEM;
1999 *name = namep;
2000 }
2001
2002 if (value && len) {
2003 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2004 if (rc) {
2005 kfree(namep);
2006 return rc;
2007 }
2008 *value = context;
2009 *len = clen;
2010 }
2011
2012 return 0;
2013 }
2014
2015 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2016 {
2017 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2018 }
2019
2020 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2021 {
2022 int rc;
2023
2024 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2025 if (rc)
2026 return rc;
2027 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2028 }
2029
2030 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2031 {
2032 int rc;
2033
2034 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2035 if (rc)
2036 return rc;
2037 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2038 }
2039
2040 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2041 {
2042 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2043 }
2044
2045 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2046 {
2047 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2048 }
2049
2050 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2051 {
2052 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2053 }
2054
2055 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2056 {
2057 int rc;
2058
2059 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2060 if (rc)
2061 return rc;
2062
2063 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2064 }
2065
2066 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2067 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2068 {
2069 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2070 }
2071
2072 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2073 {
2074 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2075 }
2076
2077 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2078 {
2079 int rc;
2080
2081 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2082 if (rc)
2083 return rc;
2084 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2085 }
2086
2087 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2088 struct nameidata *nd)
2089 {
2090 int rc;
2091
2092 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2093 if (rc)
2094 return rc;
2095
2096 if (!mask) {
2097 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2098 return 0;
2099 }
2100
2101 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2102 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2103 }
2104
2105 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2106 {
2107 int rc;
2108
2109 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2110 if (rc)
2111 return rc;
2112
2113 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2114 return 0;
2115
2116 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2117 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2118 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2119
2120 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2121 }
2122
2123 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2124 {
2125 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2126 }
2127
2128 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2129 {
2130 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2131 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2132 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2133 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2134 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2135 u32 newsid;
2136 int rc = 0;
2137
2138 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2139 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2140 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2141 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2142 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2143 Restrict to administrator. */
2144 return -EPERM;
2145 }
2146
2147 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2148 ordinary setattr permission. */
2149 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2150 }
2151
2152 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2153 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2154 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2155
2156 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2157 return -EPERM;
2158
2159 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2160 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2161
2162 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2163 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2164 if (rc)
2165 return rc;
2166
2167 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2168 if (rc)
2169 return rc;
2170
2171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2172 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2173 if (rc)
2174 return rc;
2175
2176 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2177 isec->sclass);
2178 if (rc)
2179 return rc;
2180
2181 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2182 sbsec->sid,
2183 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2184 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2185 &ad);
2186 }
2187
2188 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2189 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2190 {
2191 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2192 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2193 u32 newsid;
2194 int rc;
2195
2196 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2197 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2198 return;
2199 }
2200
2201 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2202 if (rc) {
2203 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2204 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2205 return;
2206 }
2207
2208 isec->sid = newsid;
2209 return;
2210 }
2211
2212 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2213 {
2214 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2215 }
2216
2217 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2218 {
2219 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2220 }
2221
2222 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2223 {
2224 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2225 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2226 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2227 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2228 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2229 Restrict to administrator. */
2230 return -EPERM;
2231 }
2232
2233 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2234 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2235 permission for removexattr. */
2236 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2237 }
2238
2239 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2240 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2241 return -EACCES;
2242 }
2243
2244 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2245 {
2246 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2247 }
2248
2249 /*
2250 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2251 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2252 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2253 *
2254 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2255 */
2256 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2257 {
2258 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2259
2260 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2261 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2262
2263 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2264 }
2265
2266 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2267 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2268 {
2269 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2270 u32 newsid;
2271 int rc;
2272
2273 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2274 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2275
2276 if (!value || !size)
2277 return -EACCES;
2278
2279 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2280 if (rc)
2281 return rc;
2282
2283 isec->sid = newsid;
2284 return 0;
2285 }
2286
2287 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2288 {
2289 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2290 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2291 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2292 return len;
2293 }
2294
2295 /* file security operations */
2296
2297 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2298 {
2299 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2300
2301 if (!mask) {
2302 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2303 return 0;
2304 }
2305
2306 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2307 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2308 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2309
2310 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2311 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2312 }
2313
2314 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2315 {
2316 return file_alloc_security(file);
2317 }
2318
2319 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2320 {
2321 file_free_security(file);
2322 }
2323
2324 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2325 unsigned long arg)
2326 {
2327 int error = 0;
2328
2329 switch (cmd) {
2330 case FIONREAD:
2331 /* fall through */
2332 case FIBMAP:
2333 /* fall through */
2334 case FIGETBSZ:
2335 /* fall through */
2336 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2337 /* fall through */
2338 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2339 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2340 break;
2341
2342 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2343 /* fall through */
2344 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2345 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2346 break;
2347
2348 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2349 case FIONBIO:
2350 /* fall through */
2351 case FIOASYNC:
2352 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2353 break;
2354
2355 case KDSKBENT:
2356 case KDSKBSENT:
2357 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2358 break;
2359
2360 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2361 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2362 */
2363 default:
2364 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2365
2366 }
2367 return error;
2368 }
2369
2370 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2371 {
2372 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2373 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2374 /*
2375 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2376 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2377 * This has an additional check.
2378 */
2379 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2380 if (rc)
2381 return rc;
2382 }
2383 #endif
2384
2385 if (file) {
2386 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2387 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2388
2389 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2390 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2391 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2392
2393 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2394 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2395
2396 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2397 }
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400
2401 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2402 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2403 {
2404 int rc;
2405
2406 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2407 if (rc)
2408 return rc;
2409
2410 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2411 prot = reqprot;
2412
2413 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2414 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2415 }
2416
2417 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2418 unsigned long reqprot,
2419 unsigned long prot)
2420 {
2421 int rc;
2422
2423 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2424 if (rc)
2425 return rc;
2426
2427 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2428 prot = reqprot;
2429
2430 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2431 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2432 rc = 0;
2433 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2434 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2435 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2436 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2437 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2438 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2439 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2440 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2441 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2442 /*
2443 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2444 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2445 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2446 * modified content. This typically should only
2447 * occur for text relocations.
2448 */
2449 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2450 FILE__EXECMOD);
2451 }
2452 if (rc)
2453 return rc;
2454 }
2455 #endif
2456
2457 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2458 }
2459
2460 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2461 {
2462 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2463 }
2464
2465 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2466 unsigned long arg)
2467 {
2468 int err = 0;
2469
2470 switch (cmd) {
2471 case F_SETFL:
2472 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2473 err = -EINVAL;
2474 break;
2475 }
2476
2477 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2478 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2479 break;
2480 }
2481 /* fall through */
2482 case F_SETOWN:
2483 case F_SETSIG:
2484 case F_GETFL:
2485 case F_GETOWN:
2486 case F_GETSIG:
2487 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2488 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2489 break;
2490 case F_GETLK:
2491 case F_SETLK:
2492 case F_SETLKW:
2493 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2494 case F_GETLK64:
2495 case F_SETLK64:
2496 case F_SETLKW64:
2497 #endif
2498 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2499 err = -EINVAL;
2500 break;
2501 }
2502 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2503 break;
2504 }
2505
2506 return err;
2507 }
2508
2509 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2510 {
2511 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2512 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2513
2514 tsec = current->security;
2515 fsec = file->f_security;
2516 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2517
2518 return 0;
2519 }
2520
2521 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2522 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2523 {
2524 struct file *file;
2525 u32 perm;
2526 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2527 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2528
2529 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2530 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2531
2532 tsec = tsk->security;
2533 fsec = file->f_security;
2534
2535 if (!signum)
2536 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2537 else
2538 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2539
2540 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2541 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2542 }
2543
2544 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2545 {
2546 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2547 }
2548
2549 /* task security operations */
2550
2551 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2552 {
2553 int rc;
2554
2555 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2556 if (rc)
2557 return rc;
2558
2559 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2560 }
2561
2562 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2563 {
2564 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2565 int rc;
2566
2567 tsec1 = current->security;
2568
2569 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2570 if (rc)
2571 return rc;
2572 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2573
2574 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2575 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2576
2577 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2578 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2579 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2580
2581 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2582 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2583 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2584 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2585
2586 return 0;
2587 }
2588
2589 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2590 {
2591 task_free_security(tsk);
2592 }
2593
2594 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2595 {
2596 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2597 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2598 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2599 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2600 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2601 capable hook. */
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
2605 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2606 {
2607 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2608 }
2609
2610 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2611 {
2612 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2613 return 0;
2614 }
2615
2616 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2617 {
2618 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2619 }
2620
2621 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2622 {
2623 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2624 }
2625
2626 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2627 {
2628 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2629 }
2630
2631 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2632 {
2633 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2634 return 0;
2635 }
2636
2637 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2638 {
2639 int rc;
2640
2641 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2642 if (rc)
2643 return rc;
2644
2645 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2646 }
2647
2648 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2649 {
2650 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2651 }
2652
2653 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2654 {
2655 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2656 int rc;
2657
2658 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2659 if (rc)
2660 return rc;
2661
2662 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2663 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2664 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2665 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2666 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2667 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2668
2669 return 0;
2670 }
2671
2672 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2673 {
2674 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2675 }
2676
2677 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2678 {
2679 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2680 }
2681
2682 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2683 {
2684 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2685 }
2686
2687 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2688 {
2689 u32 perm;
2690 int rc;
2691
2692 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2693 if (rc)
2694 return rc;
2695
2696 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2697 return 0;
2698
2699 if (!sig)
2700 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2701 else
2702 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2703
2704 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2705 }
2706
2707 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2708 unsigned long arg2,
2709 unsigned long arg3,
2710 unsigned long arg4,
2711 unsigned long arg5)
2712 {
2713 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2714 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2715 the state of the current process. */
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718
2719 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2720 {
2721 u32 perm;
2722
2723 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2724
2725 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2726 }
2727
2728 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2729 {
2730 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2731
2732 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2733
2734 tsec = p->security;
2735 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2736 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2737 return;
2738 }
2739
2740 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2741 struct inode *inode)
2742 {
2743 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2744 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2745
2746 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2747 isec->initialized = 1;
2748 return;
2749 }
2750
2751 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2752 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2753 {
2754 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2755 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2756
2757 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2758 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2759 if (ih == NULL)
2760 goto out;
2761
2762 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2763 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2764 goto out;
2765
2766 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2767 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2768 ret = 0;
2769
2770 switch (ih->protocol) {
2771 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2772 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2773
2774 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2775 break;
2776
2777 offset += ihlen;
2778 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2779 if (th == NULL)
2780 break;
2781
2782 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2783 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2784 break;
2785 }
2786
2787 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2788 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2789
2790 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2791 break;
2792
2793 offset += ihlen;
2794 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2795 if (uh == NULL)
2796 break;
2797
2798 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2799 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2800 break;
2801 }
2802
2803 default:
2804 break;
2805 }
2806 out:
2807 return ret;
2808 }
2809
2810 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2811
2812 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2813 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2814 {
2815 u8 nexthdr;
2816 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2817 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2818
2819 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2820 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2821 if (ip6 == NULL)
2822 goto out;
2823
2824 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2825 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2826 ret = 0;
2827
2828 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2829 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2830 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2831 if (offset < 0)
2832 goto out;
2833
2834 switch (nexthdr) {
2835 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2836 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2837
2838 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2839 if (th == NULL)
2840 break;
2841
2842 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2843 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2844 break;
2845 }
2846
2847 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2848 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2849
2850 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2851 if (uh == NULL)
2852 break;
2853
2854 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2855 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2856 break;
2857 }
2858
2859 /* includes fragments */
2860 default:
2861 break;
2862 }
2863 out:
2864 return ret;
2865 }
2866
2867 #endif /* IPV6 */
2868
2869 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2870 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2871 {
2872 int ret = 0;
2873
2874 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2875 case PF_INET:
2876 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2877 if (ret || !addrp)
2878 break;
2879 *len = 4;
2880 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2881 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2882 break;
2883
2884 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2885 case PF_INET6:
2886 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2887 if (ret || !addrp)
2888 break;
2889 *len = 16;
2890 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2891 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2892 break;
2893 #endif /* IPV6 */
2894 default:
2895 break;
2896 }
2897
2898 return ret;
2899 }
2900
2901 /* socket security operations */
2902 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2903 u32 perms)
2904 {
2905 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2906 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2907 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2908 int err = 0;
2909
2910 tsec = task->security;
2911 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2912
2913 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2914 goto out;
2915
2916 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2917 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2918 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2919
2920 out:
2921 return err;
2922 }
2923
2924 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2925 int protocol, int kern)
2926 {
2927 int err = 0;
2928 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2929
2930 if (kern)
2931 goto out;
2932
2933 tsec = current->security;
2934 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2935 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2936 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2937
2938 out:
2939 return err;
2940 }
2941
2942 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2943 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2944 {
2945 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2946 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2947
2948 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2949
2950 tsec = current->security;
2951 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2952 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2953 isec->initialized = 1;
2954
2955 return;
2956 }
2957
2958 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2959 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2960 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2961 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2962 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2963
2964 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2965 {
2966 u16 family;
2967 int err;
2968
2969 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2970 if (err)
2971 goto out;
2972
2973 /*
2974 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
2975 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
2976 * check the first address now.
2977 */
2978 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
2979 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
2980 char *addrp;
2981 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2982 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2983 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2984 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
2985 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
2986 unsigned short snum;
2987 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2988 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
2989
2990 tsec = current->security;
2991 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2992
2993 if (family == PF_INET) {
2994 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
2995 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
2996 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
2997 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
2998 } else {
2999 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3000 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3001 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3002 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3003 }
3004
3005 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3006 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3007 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3008 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3009 if (err)
3010 goto out;
3011 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3012 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3013 ad.u.net.family = family;
3014 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3015 isec->sclass,
3016 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3017 if (err)
3018 goto out;
3019 }
3020
3021 switch(isec->sclass) {
3022 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3023 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3024 break;
3025
3026 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3027 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3028 break;
3029
3030 default:
3031 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3032 break;
3033 }
3034
3035 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3036 if (err)
3037 goto out;
3038
3039 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3040 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3041 ad.u.net.family = family;
3042
3043 if (family == PF_INET)
3044 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3045 else
3046 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3047
3048 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3049 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3050 if (err)
3051 goto out;
3052 }
3053 out:
3054 return err;
3055 }
3056
3057 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3058 {
3059 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3060 int err;
3061
3062 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3063 if (err)
3064 return err;
3065
3066 /*
3067 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3068 */
3069 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3070 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3071 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3072 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3073 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3074 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3075 unsigned short snum;
3076 u32 sid;
3077
3078 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3079 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3080 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3081 return -EINVAL;
3082 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3083 } else {
3084 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3085 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3086 return -EINVAL;
3087 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3088 }
3089
3090 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3091 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3092 if (err)
3093 goto out;
3094
3095 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3096 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3097 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3098 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3099 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3100 if (err)
3101 goto out;
3102 }
3103
3104 out:
3105 return err;
3106 }
3107
3108 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3109 {
3110 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3111 }
3112
3113 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3114 {
3115 int err;
3116 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3117 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3118
3119 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3120 if (err)
3121 return err;
3122
3123 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3124
3125 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3126 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3127 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3128 newisec->initialized = 1;
3129
3130 return 0;
3131 }
3132
3133 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3134 int size)
3135 {
3136 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3137 }
3138
3139 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3140 int size, int flags)
3141 {
3142 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3143 }
3144
3145 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3146 {
3147 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3148 }
3149
3150 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3151 {
3152 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3153 }
3154
3155 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3156 {
3157 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3161 int optname)
3162 {
3163 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3164 }
3165
3166 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3167 {
3168 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3169 }
3170
3171 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3172 struct socket *other,
3173 struct sock *newsk)
3174 {
3175 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3176 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3177 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3178 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3179 int err;
3180
3181 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3182 if (err)
3183 return err;
3184
3185 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3186 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3187
3188 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3189 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3190
3191 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3192 isec->sclass,
3193 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3194 if (err)
3195 return err;
3196
3197 /* connecting socket */
3198 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3199 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3200
3201 /* server child socket */
3202 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3203 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3204
3205 return 0;
3206 }
3207
3208 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3209 struct socket *other)
3210 {
3211 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3212 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3213 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3214 int err;
3215
3216 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3217 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3218
3219 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3220 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3221
3222 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3223 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3224 if (err)
3225 return err;
3226
3227 return 0;
3228 }
3229
3230 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3231 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class,
3232 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3233 {
3234 int err = 0;
3235 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3236
3237 if (!skb->dev)
3238 goto out;
3239
3240 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3241 if (err)
3242 goto out;
3243
3244 switch (sock_class) {
3245 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3246 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3247 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3248 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3249 break;
3250
3251 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3252 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3253 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3254 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3255 break;
3256
3257 default:
3258 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3259 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3260 break;
3261 }
3262
3263 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3264 if (err)
3265 goto out;
3266
3267 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3268 if (err)
3269 goto out;
3270
3271 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3272 if (err)
3273 goto out;
3274
3275 if (recv_perm) {
3276 u32 port_sid;
3277
3278 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3279 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3280 &port_sid);
3281 if (err)
3282 goto out;
3283
3284 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3285 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3286 }
3287
3288 out:
3289 return err;
3290 }
3291
3292 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3293 {
3294 u16 family;
3295 u16 sock_class = 0;
3296 char *addrp;
3297 int len, err = 0;
3298 u32 sock_sid = 0;
3299 struct socket *sock;
3300 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3301
3302 family = sk->sk_family;
3303 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3304 goto out;
3305
3306 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3307 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3308 family = PF_INET;
3309
3310 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3311 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3312 if (sock) {
3313 struct inode *inode;
3314 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3315 if (inode) {
3316 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3317 isec = inode->i_security;
3318 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3319 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3320 }
3321 }
3322 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3323 if (!sock_sid)
3324 goto out;
3325
3326 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3327 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3328 ad.u.net.family = family;
3329
3330 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3331 if (err)
3332 goto out;
3333
3334 if (selinux_compat_net)
3335 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid,
3336 sock_class, family,
3337 addrp, len);
3338 else
3339 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3340 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3341 if (err)
3342 goto out;
3343
3344 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
3345 out:
3346 return err;
3347 }
3348
3349 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3350 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3351 {
3352 int err = 0;
3353 char *scontext;
3354 u32 scontext_len;
3355 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3356 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3357 u32 peer_sid = 0;
3358
3359 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3360
3361 /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3362 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3363 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3364 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3365 }
3366 else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3367 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3368
3369 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3370 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3371 goto out;
3372 }
3373 }
3374 else {
3375 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3376 goto out;
3377 }
3378
3379 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3380
3381 if (err)
3382 goto out;
3383
3384 if (scontext_len > len) {
3385 err = -ERANGE;
3386 goto out_len;
3387 }
3388
3389 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3390 err = -EFAULT;
3391
3392 out_len:
3393 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3394 err = -EFAULT;
3395
3396 kfree(scontext);
3397 out:
3398 return err;
3399 }
3400
3401 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3402 {
3403 int err = 0;
3404 u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3405
3406 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3407 return -EINVAL;
3408
3409 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
3410 if (err)
3411 return err;
3412
3413 return 0;
3414 }
3415
3416
3417
3418 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3419 {
3420 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3421 }
3422
3423 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3424 {
3425 sk_free_security(sk);
3426 }
3427
3428 static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
3429 {
3430 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3431 u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3432
3433 if (!sk)
3434 return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
3435
3436 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3437 isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
3438
3439 if (isec)
3440 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3441
3442 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3443 return sock_sid;
3444 }
3445
3446 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3447 {
3448 int err = 0;
3449 u32 perm;
3450 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3451 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3452 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3453
3454 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3455 err = -EINVAL;
3456 goto out;
3457 }
3458 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3459
3460 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3461 if (err) {
3462 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3463 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3464 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3465 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3466 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3467 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3468 err = 0;
3469 }
3470
3471 /* Ignore */
3472 if (err == -ENOENT)
3473 err = 0;
3474 goto out;
3475 }
3476
3477 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3478 out:
3479 return err;
3480 }
3481
3482 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3483
3484 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3485 struct inode_security_struct *isec,
3486 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3487 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3488 {
3489 int err;
3490 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3491
3492 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3493 if (err)
3494 goto out;
3495
3496 switch (isec->sclass) {
3497 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3498 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3499 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3500 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3501 break;
3502
3503 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3504 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3505 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3506 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3507 break;
3508
3509 default:
3510 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3511 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3512 break;
3513 }
3514
3515 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3516 if (err)
3517 goto out;
3518
3519 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3520 if (err)
3521 goto out;
3522
3523 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3524 if (err)
3525 goto out;
3526
3527 if (send_perm) {
3528 u32 port_sid;
3529
3530 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3531 sk->sk_type,
3532 sk->sk_protocol,
3533 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3534 &port_sid);
3535 if (err)
3536 goto out;
3537
3538 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3539 send_perm, ad);
3540 }
3541 out:
3542 return err;
3543 }
3544
3545 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3546 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3547 const struct net_device *in,
3548 const struct net_device *out,
3549 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3550 u16 family)
3551 {
3552 char *addrp;
3553 int len, err = 0;
3554 struct sock *sk;
3555 struct socket *sock;
3556 struct inode *inode;
3557 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3558 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3559 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3560 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3561
3562 sk = skb->sk;
3563 if (!sk)
3564 goto out;
3565
3566 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3567 if (!sock)
3568 goto out;
3569
3570 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3571 if (!inode)
3572 goto out;
3573
3574 isec = inode->i_security;
3575
3576 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3577 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3578 ad.u.net.family = family;
3579
3580 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3581 if (err)
3582 goto out;
3583
3584 if (selinux_compat_net)
3585 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad,
3586 family, addrp, len);
3587 else
3588 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3589 PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3590
3591 if (err)
3592 goto out;
3593
3594 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
3595 out:
3596 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3597 }
3598
3599 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3600 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3601 const struct net_device *in,
3602 const struct net_device *out,
3603 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3604 {
3605 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3606 }
3607
3608 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3609
3610 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3611 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3612 const struct net_device *in,
3613 const struct net_device *out,
3614 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3615 {
3616 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3617 }
3618
3619 #endif /* IPV6 */
3620
3621 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3622
3623 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3624 {
3625 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3626 struct av_decision avd;
3627 int err;
3628
3629 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3630 if (err)
3631 return err;
3632
3633 tsec = current->security;
3634
3635 avd.allowed = 0;
3636 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3637 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3638 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3639
3640 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3641 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3642
3643 return err;
3644 }
3645
3646 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3647 {
3648 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3649 return -EPERM;
3650 return 0;
3651 }
3652
3653 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3654 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3655 u16 sclass)
3656 {
3657 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3658 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3659
3660 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3661 if (!isec)
3662 return -ENOMEM;
3663
3664 isec->sclass = sclass;
3665 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3666 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3667 perm->security = isec;
3668
3669 return 0;
3670 }
3671
3672 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3673 {
3674 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3675 perm->security = NULL;
3676 kfree(isec);
3677 }
3678
3679 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3680 {
3681 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3682
3683 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3684 if (!msec)
3685 return -ENOMEM;
3686
3687 msec->msg = msg;
3688 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3689 msg->security = msec;
3690
3691 return 0;
3692 }
3693
3694 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3695 {
3696 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3697
3698 msg->security = NULL;
3699 kfree(msec);
3700 }
3701
3702 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3703 u32 perms)
3704 {
3705 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3706 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3707 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3708
3709 tsec = current->security;
3710 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3711
3712 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3713 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3714
3715 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3716 }
3717
3718 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3719 {
3720 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3721 }
3722
3723 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3724 {
3725 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3726 }
3727
3728 /* message queue security operations */
3729 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3730 {
3731 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3732 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3733 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3734 int rc;
3735
3736 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3737 if (rc)
3738 return rc;
3739
3740 tsec = current->security;
3741 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3742
3743 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3744 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3745
3746 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3747 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3748 if (rc) {
3749 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3750 return rc;
3751 }
3752 return 0;
3753 }
3754
3755 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3756 {
3757 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3758 }
3759
3760 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3761 {
3762 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3763 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3764 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3765
3766 tsec = current->security;
3767 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3768
3769 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3770 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3771
3772 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3773 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3774 }
3775
3776 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3777 {
3778 int err;
3779 int perms;
3780
3781 switch(cmd) {
3782 case IPC_INFO:
3783 case MSG_INFO:
3784 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3785 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3786 case IPC_STAT:
3787 case MSG_STAT:
3788 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3789 break;
3790 case IPC_SET:
3791 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3792 break;
3793 case IPC_RMID:
3794 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3795 break;
3796 default:
3797 return 0;
3798 }
3799
3800 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3801 return err;
3802 }
3803
3804 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3805 {
3806 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3807 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3808 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3809 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3810 int rc;
3811
3812 tsec = current->security;
3813 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3814 msec = msg->security;
3815
3816 /*
3817 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3818 */
3819 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3820 /*
3821 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3822 * message queue this message will be stored in
3823 */
3824 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3825 isec->sid,
3826 SECCLASS_MSG,
3827 &msec->sid);
3828 if (rc)
3829 return rc;
3830 }
3831
3832 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3833 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3834
3835 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3836 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3837 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
3838 if (!rc)
3839 /* Can this process send the message */
3840 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3841 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3842 if (!rc)
3843 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3844 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3845 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3846
3847 return rc;
3848 }
3849
3850 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3851 struct task_struct *target,
3852 long type, int mode)
3853 {
3854 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3855 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3856 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3857 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3858 int rc;
3859
3860 tsec = target->security;
3861 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3862 msec = msg->security;
3863
3864 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3865 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3866
3867 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3868 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3869 if (!rc)
3870 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3871 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3872 return rc;
3873 }
3874
3875 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3876 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3877 {
3878 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3879 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3880 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3881 int rc;
3882
3883 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3884 if (rc)
3885 return rc;
3886
3887 tsec = current->security;
3888 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3889
3890 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3891 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3892
3893 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3894 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
3895 if (rc) {
3896 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3897 return rc;
3898 }
3899 return 0;
3900 }
3901
3902 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3903 {
3904 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3905 }
3906
3907 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3908 {
3909 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3910 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3911 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3912
3913 tsec = current->security;
3914 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3915
3916 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3917 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3918
3919 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3920 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3921 }
3922
3923 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3924 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3925 {
3926 int perms;
3927 int err;
3928
3929 switch(cmd) {
3930 case IPC_INFO:
3931 case SHM_INFO:
3932 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3933 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3934 case IPC_STAT:
3935 case SHM_STAT:
3936 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3937 break;
3938 case IPC_SET:
3939 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3940 break;
3941 case SHM_LOCK:
3942 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3943 perms = SHM__LOCK;
3944 break;
3945 case IPC_RMID:
3946 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3947 break;
3948 default:
3949 return 0;
3950 }
3951
3952 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3953 return err;
3954 }
3955
3956 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3957 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3958 {
3959 u32 perms;
3960 int rc;
3961
3962 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3963 if (rc)
3964 return rc;
3965
3966 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3967 perms = SHM__READ;
3968 else
3969 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3970
3971 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3972 }
3973
3974 /* Semaphore security operations */
3975 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3976 {
3977 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3978 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3979 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3980 int rc;
3981
3982 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3983 if (rc)
3984 return rc;
3985
3986 tsec = current->security;
3987 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3988
3989 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3990 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3991
3992 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3993 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
3994 if (rc) {
3995 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3996 return rc;
3997 }
3998 return 0;
3999 }
4000
4001 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4002 {
4003 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4004 }
4005
4006 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4007 {
4008 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4009 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4010 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4011
4012 tsec = current->security;
4013 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4014
4015 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4016 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4017
4018 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4019 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4020 }
4021
4022 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4023 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4024 {
4025 int err;
4026 u32 perms;
4027
4028 switch(cmd) {
4029 case IPC_INFO:
4030 case SEM_INFO:
4031 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4032 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4033 case GETPID:
4034 case GETNCNT:
4035 case GETZCNT:
4036 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4037 break;
4038 case GETVAL:
4039 case GETALL:
4040 perms = SEM__READ;
4041 break;
4042 case SETVAL:
4043 case SETALL:
4044 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4045 break;
4046 case IPC_RMID:
4047 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4048 break;
4049 case IPC_SET:
4050 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4051 break;
4052 case IPC_STAT:
4053 case SEM_STAT:
4054 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4055 break;
4056 default:
4057 return 0;
4058 }
4059
4060 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4061 return err;
4062 }
4063
4064 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4065 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4066 {
4067 u32 perms;
4068
4069 if (alter)
4070 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4071 else
4072 perms = SEM__READ;
4073
4074 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4075 }
4076
4077 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4078 {
4079 u32 av = 0;
4080
4081 av = 0;
4082 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4083 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4084 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4085 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4086
4087 if (av == 0)
4088 return 0;
4089
4090 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4091 }
4092
4093 /* module stacking operations */
4094 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4095 {
4096 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4097 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4098 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4099 return -EINVAL;
4100 }
4101
4102 secondary_ops = ops;
4103
4104 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4105 __FUNCTION__,
4106 name);
4107
4108 return 0;
4109 }
4110
4111 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4112 {
4113 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4114 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4115 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4116 return -EINVAL;
4117 }
4118
4119 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4120
4121 return 0;
4122 }
4123
4124 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4125 {
4126 if (inode)
4127 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4128 }
4129
4130 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4131 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4132 {
4133 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4134 u32 sid;
4135 int error;
4136
4137 if (current != p) {
4138 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4139 if (error)
4140 return error;
4141 }
4142
4143 tsec = p->security;
4144
4145 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4146 sid = tsec->sid;
4147 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4148 sid = tsec->osid;
4149 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4150 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4151 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4152 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4153 else
4154 return -EINVAL;
4155
4156 if (!sid)
4157 return 0;
4158
4159 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4160 }
4161
4162 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4163 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4164 {
4165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4166 u32 sid = 0;
4167 int error;
4168 char *str = value;
4169
4170 if (current != p) {
4171 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4172 security attributes. */
4173 return -EACCES;
4174 }
4175
4176 /*
4177 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4178 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4179 * above restriction is ever removed.
4180 */
4181 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4182 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4183 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4184 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4185 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4186 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4187 else
4188 error = -EINVAL;
4189 if (error)
4190 return error;
4191
4192 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4193 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4194 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4195 str[size-1] = 0;
4196 size--;
4197 }
4198 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4199 if (error)
4200 return error;
4201 }
4202
4203 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4204 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4205 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4206 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4207 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4208 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4209 tsec = p->security;
4210 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4211 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4212 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4213 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4214 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4215 struct av_decision avd;
4216
4217 if (sid == 0)
4218 return -EINVAL;
4219
4220 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4221 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4222 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4223 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4224 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4225 do_each_thread(g, t)
4226 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4227 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4228 return -EPERM;
4229 }
4230 while_each_thread(g, t);
4231 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4232 }
4233
4234 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4235 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4236 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4237 if (error)
4238 return error;
4239
4240 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4241 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4242 task_lock(p);
4243 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4244 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4245 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4246 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4247 if (!error)
4248 tsec->sid = sid;
4249 task_unlock(p);
4250 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4251 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4252 if (error)
4253 return error;
4254 } else {
4255 tsec->sid = sid;
4256 task_unlock(p);
4257 }
4258 }
4259 else
4260 return -EINVAL;
4261
4262 return size;
4263 }
4264
4265 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4266
4267 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4268 unsigned long flags)
4269 {
4270 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4271 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4272
4273 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4274 if (!ksec)
4275 return -ENOMEM;
4276
4277 ksec->obj = k;
4278 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4279 k->security = ksec;
4280
4281 return 0;
4282 }
4283
4284 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4285 {
4286 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4287
4288 k->security = NULL;
4289 kfree(ksec);
4290 }
4291
4292 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4293 struct task_struct *ctx,
4294 key_perm_t perm)
4295 {
4296 struct key *key;
4297 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4298 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4299
4300 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4301
4302 tsec = ctx->security;
4303 ksec = key->security;
4304
4305 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4306 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4307 appear to be created. */
4308 if (perm == 0)
4309 return 0;
4310
4311 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4312 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4313 }
4314
4315 #endif
4316
4317 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4318 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4319 .capget = selinux_capget,
4320 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4321 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4322 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4323 .capable = selinux_capable,
4324 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4325 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4326 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4327 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4328
4329 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4330 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4331
4332 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4333 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4334 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4335 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4336 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4337 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4338 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4339
4340 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4341 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4342 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4343 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4344 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4345 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4346 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4347
4348 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4349 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4350 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4351 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4352 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4353 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4354 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4355 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4356 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4357 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4358 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4359 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4360 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4361 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4362 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4363 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4364 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4365 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4366 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4367 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4368 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4369 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4370 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4371 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4372 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4373
4374 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4375 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4376 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4377 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4378 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4379 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4380 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4381 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4382 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4383 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4384 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4385
4386 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4387 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4388 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4389 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4390 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4391 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4392 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4393 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4394 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4395 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4396 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4397 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4398 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4399 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4400 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4401 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4402 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4403 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4404 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4405 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4406 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4407
4408 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4409
4410 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4411 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4412
4413 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4414 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4415 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4416 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4417 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4418 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4419
4420 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4421 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4422 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4423 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4424 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4425
4426 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4427 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4428 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4429 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4430 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4431
4432 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4433 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4434
4435 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4436
4437 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4438 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4439
4440 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4441 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4442
4443 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4444 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4445 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4446 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4447 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4448 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4449 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4450 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4451 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4452 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4453 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4454 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4455 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4456 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4457 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4458 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4459 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4460 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4461 .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
4462
4463 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4464 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4465 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4466 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4467 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4468 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4469 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4470 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4471 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4472 #endif
4473
4474 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4475 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4476 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4477 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4478 #endif
4479 };
4480
4481 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4482 {
4483 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4484
4485 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4486 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4487 return 0;
4488 }
4489
4490 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4491
4492 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4493 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4494 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4495 tsec = current->security;
4496 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4497
4498 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4499 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4500 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4501 avc_init();
4502
4503 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4504 if (!secondary_ops)
4505 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4506 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4507 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4508
4509 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4510 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4511 } else {
4512 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4513 }
4514
4515 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4516 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4517 security_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4518 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4519 security_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4520 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4521 #endif
4522
4523 return 0;
4524 }
4525
4526 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4527 {
4528 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4529
4530 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4531 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4532 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4533 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4534 next_sb:
4535 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4536 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4537 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4538 struct superblock_security_struct,
4539 list);
4540 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4541 sb->s_count++;
4542 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4543 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4544 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4545 if (sb->s_root)
4546 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4547 drop_super(sb);
4548 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4549 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4550 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4551 goto next_sb;
4552 }
4553 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4554 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4555 }
4556
4557 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4558 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4559 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4560
4561 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4562
4563 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4564 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4565 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4566 .pf = PF_INET,
4567 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4568 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4569 };
4570
4571 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4572
4573 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4574 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4575 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4576 .pf = PF_INET6,
4577 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4578 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4579 };
4580
4581 #endif /* IPV6 */
4582
4583 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4584 {
4585 int err = 0;
4586
4587 if (!selinux_enabled)
4588 goto out;
4589
4590 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4591
4592 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4593 if (err)
4594 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4595
4596 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4597
4598 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4599 if (err)
4600 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4601
4602 #endif /* IPV6 */
4603
4604 out:
4605 return err;
4606 }
4607
4608 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4609
4610 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4611 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4612 {
4613 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4614
4615 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4616 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4617 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4618 #endif /* IPV6 */
4619 }
4620 #endif
4621
4622 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4623
4624 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4625 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4626 #endif
4627
4628 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4629
4630 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4631 int selinux_disable(void)
4632 {
4633 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4634 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4635
4636 if (ss_initialized) {
4637 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4638 return -EINVAL;
4639 }
4640
4641 if (selinux_disabled) {
4642 /* Only do this once. */
4643 return -EINVAL;
4644 }
4645
4646 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4647
4648 selinux_disabled = 1;
4649 selinux_enabled = 0;
4650
4651 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4652 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4653
4654 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4655 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4656
4657 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4658 exit_sel_fs();
4659
4660 return 0;
4661 }
4662 #endif
4663
4664
WRT350N Kernel Patches