OMAPDSS: VENC: fix NULL pointer dereference in DSS2 VENC sysfs debug attr on OMAP4
[zen-stable.git] / security / apparmor / file.c
blob7312db74121993a9fd250b9895812f1704bc21cc
1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
4 * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
15 #include "include/apparmor.h"
16 #include "include/audit.h"
17 #include "include/file.h"
18 #include "include/match.h"
19 #include "include/path.h"
20 #include "include/policy.h"
22 struct file_perms nullperms;
25 /**
26 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
30 static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
32 char str[10];
34 char *m = str;
36 if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
37 *m++ = 'm';
38 if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ))
39 *m++ = 'r';
40 if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD |
41 AA_MAY_CHOWN))
42 *m++ = 'w';
43 else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
44 *m++ = 'a';
45 if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE)
46 *m++ = 'c';
47 if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE)
48 *m++ = 'd';
49 if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
50 *m++ = 'l';
51 if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
52 *m++ = 'k';
53 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
54 *m++ = 'x';
55 *m = '\0';
57 audit_log_string(ab, str);
60 /**
61 * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
62 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
63 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
65 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
67 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
68 uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
70 if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
71 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
72 audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request);
74 if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
75 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
76 audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied);
78 if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
79 audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
80 audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid);
83 if (sa->aad.fs.target) {
84 audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
85 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target);
89 /**
90 * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
91 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
92 * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
93 * @gfp: allocation flags
94 * @op: operation being mediated
95 * @request: permissions requested
96 * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
97 * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
98 * @ouid: object uid
99 * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
100 * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
102 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
104 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
105 gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
106 const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
108 int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
109 struct common_audit_data sa;
110 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
111 sa.aad.op = op,
112 sa.aad.fs.request = request;
113 sa.aad.name = name;
114 sa.aad.fs.target = target;
115 sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
116 sa.aad.info = info;
117 sa.aad.error = error;
119 if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
120 u32 mask = perms->audit;
122 if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
123 mask = 0xffff;
125 /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
126 sa.aad.fs.request &= mask;
128 if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request))
129 return 0;
130 type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
131 } else {
132 /* only report permissions that were denied */
133 sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
135 if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill)
136 type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
138 /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
139 if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
140 AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
141 AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
142 sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
144 if (!sa.aad.fs.request)
145 return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
148 sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
149 return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
153 * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
154 * @old: permission set in old mapping
156 * Returns: new permission mapping
158 static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
160 u32 new = old & 0xf;
161 if (old & MAY_READ)
162 new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
163 if (old & MAY_WRITE)
164 new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
165 AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN;
166 if (old & 0x10)
167 new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
168 /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
169 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
171 if (old & 0x20)
172 new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
173 if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
174 new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
176 new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
178 return new;
182 * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
183 * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
184 * @state: state in dfa
185 * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
187 * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
188 * at load time.
190 * Returns: computed permission set
192 static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
193 struct path_cond *cond)
195 struct file_perms perms;
197 /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
198 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
199 * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
200 * done at profile load
202 perms.kill = 0;
204 if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) {
205 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
206 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
207 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
208 perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
209 } else {
210 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
211 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
212 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
213 perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
216 /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
217 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
218 perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
220 return perms;
224 * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
225 * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
226 * @state: state to start matching in
227 * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL)
228 * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL)
229 * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
231 * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
233 unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
234 const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
235 struct file_perms *perms)
237 unsigned int state;
238 if (!dfa) {
239 *perms = nullperms;
240 return DFA_NOMATCH;
243 state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
244 *perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
246 return state;
250 * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
251 * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
253 * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
255 static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
257 if (d_unlinked(dentry) && dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0)
258 return 1;
259 return 0;
263 * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
264 * @op: operation being checked
265 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
266 * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
267 * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
268 * @request: requested permissions
269 * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL)
271 * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
273 int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
274 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond)
276 char *buffer = NULL;
277 struct file_perms perms = {};
278 const char *name, *info = NULL;
279 int error;
281 flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
282 error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name);
283 if (error) {
284 if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
285 /* Access to open files that are deleted are
286 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
288 error = 0;
289 perms.allow = request;
290 } else if (error == -ENOENT)
291 info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
292 else if (error == -ESTALE)
293 info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
294 else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
295 info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
296 else
297 info = "Failed name lookup";
298 } else {
299 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
300 &perms);
301 if (request & ~perms.allow)
302 error = -EACCES;
304 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
305 NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
306 kfree(buffer);
308 return error;
312 * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
313 * @link: link permission set
314 * @target: target permission set
316 * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
317 * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
318 * a subset of permissions that the target has.
320 * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
322 static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
324 if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
325 ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
326 return 0;
328 return 1;
332 * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
333 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
334 * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
335 * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
336 * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
338 * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
339 * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
340 * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
341 * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
342 * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
344 * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
345 * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
347 * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
349 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
350 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
352 struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
353 struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
354 struct path_cond cond = {
355 old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
356 old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
358 char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
359 const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL;
360 struct file_perms lperms, perms;
361 u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
362 unsigned int state;
363 int error;
365 lperms = nullperms;
367 /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
368 error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname);
369 if (error)
370 goto audit;
372 /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
373 error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname);
374 if (error)
375 goto audit;
377 error = -EACCES;
378 /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
379 state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
380 &cond, &lperms);
382 if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
383 goto audit;
385 /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
386 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
387 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms);
389 /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
390 * in the link pair.
392 lperms.audit = perms.audit;
393 lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
394 lperms.kill = perms.kill;
396 if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
397 info = "target restricted";
398 goto audit;
401 /* done if link subset test is not required */
402 if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
403 goto done_tests;
405 /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
406 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
408 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond,
409 &perms);
411 /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
412 request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
413 lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
415 request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
416 if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
417 goto audit;
418 } else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
419 !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
420 lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
421 request |= MAY_EXEC;
422 info = "link not subset of target";
423 goto audit;
426 done_tests:
427 error = 0;
429 audit:
430 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
431 lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
432 kfree(buffer);
433 kfree(buffer2);
435 return error;
439 * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
440 * @op: operation being checked
441 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
442 * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
443 * @request: requested permissions
445 * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
447 int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
448 u32 request)
450 struct path_cond cond = {
451 .uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
452 .mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
455 return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
456 request, &cond);