1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
80 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
81 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
82 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
83 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
85 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
86 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
87 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
90 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
92 /* number of audit rules */
95 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
98 struct audit_aux_data
{
99 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
103 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
105 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
106 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
108 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
109 struct audit_aux_data d
;
110 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
111 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
112 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
113 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
114 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
115 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
119 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
120 struct audit_aux_data d
;
121 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
122 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
123 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
124 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
127 struct audit_tree_refs
{
128 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
129 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
132 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
139 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
141 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
142 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
144 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
145 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
147 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
148 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
151 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
152 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
155 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
156 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
158 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
163 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
165 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
166 case 4: /* socketcall */
167 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
169 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
175 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
177 struct audit_names
*n
;
178 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
183 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
184 if ((n
->ino
!= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
) &&
185 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
193 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
194 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
195 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
196 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
197 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
198 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
199 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
202 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
203 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
207 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
211 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
213 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
214 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
216 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
217 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
226 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
232 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
234 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
235 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
241 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
243 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
244 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
249 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
250 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
252 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
253 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
256 /* we started with empty chain */
257 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
259 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
264 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
266 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
270 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
271 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
275 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
279 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
281 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
282 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
288 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
290 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
291 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
296 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
297 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
298 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
303 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
304 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
311 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
312 struct audit_names
*name
,
313 struct audit_field
*f
,
314 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
316 struct audit_names
*n
;
320 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
326 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
327 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
335 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
336 struct audit_names
*name
,
337 struct audit_field
*f
,
338 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
340 struct audit_names
*n
;
344 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
350 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
351 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
359 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
360 const struct cred
*cred
,
361 struct audit_field
*f
,
362 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
363 struct audit_names
*name
)
366 /* process to file object comparisons */
367 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
368 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
369 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
370 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
372 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
374 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
376 return audit_compare_uid(tsk
->loginuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
378 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
380 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
382 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
383 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
384 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
385 /* uid comparisons */
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, tsk
->loginuid
);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
393 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
394 /* auid comparisons */
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
396 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
401 /* euid comparisons */
402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
403 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
406 /* suid comparisons */
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
409 /* gid comparisons */
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
411 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
413 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
415 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
416 /* egid comparisons */
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
418 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
420 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
421 /* sgid comparison */
422 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
423 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
425 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
431 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
432 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
435 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
436 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
437 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
439 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
440 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
441 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
442 struct audit_names
*name
,
443 enum audit_state
*state
,
446 const struct cred
*cred
;
450 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
452 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
453 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
454 struct audit_names
*n
;
460 pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
461 result
= audit_comparator(pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
466 ctx
->ppid
= task_ppid_nr(tsk
);
467 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
471 result
= audit_exe_compare(tsk
, rule
->exe
);
472 if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
)
476 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
479 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
482 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
485 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
488 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
489 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
491 result
= in_group_p(f
->gid
);
492 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
494 result
= !in_group_p(f
->gid
);
498 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
499 if (f
->op
== Audit_equal
) {
501 result
= in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
502 } else if (f
->op
== Audit_not_equal
) {
504 result
= !in_egroup_p(f
->gid
);
508 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
511 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
514 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
518 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
522 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
523 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
526 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
528 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
530 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
535 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
536 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
539 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
540 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
541 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
550 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
551 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
554 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
555 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
556 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
565 result
= audit_comparator(name
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
567 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
568 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
577 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
579 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
580 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
589 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
591 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
592 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
601 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
605 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
608 result
= audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
610 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET
:
611 result
= audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk
), f
->op
, f
->val
);
613 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
614 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
615 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
618 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
619 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
620 match for now to avoid losing information that
621 may be wanted. An error message will also be
625 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
628 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
637 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
638 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
639 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
642 /* Find files that match */
644 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
645 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
648 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
649 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
657 /* Find ipc objects that match */
658 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
660 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
671 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
673 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
674 /* ignore this field for filtering */
678 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
681 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
683 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
684 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
692 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
694 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
695 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
696 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
698 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
700 switch (rule
->action
) {
702 *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
;
705 *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
711 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
712 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
713 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
715 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
717 struct audit_entry
*e
;
718 enum audit_state state
;
721 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
722 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
724 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
725 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
731 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
734 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule
*rule
, unsigned long val
)
738 if (val
> 0xffffffff)
741 word
= AUDIT_WORD(val
);
742 if (word
>= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE
)
745 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(val
);
747 return rule
->mask
[word
] & bit
;
750 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
751 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
752 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
753 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
755 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
756 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
757 struct list_head
*list
)
759 struct audit_entry
*e
;
760 enum audit_state state
;
762 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
763 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
766 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
767 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
768 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
769 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
772 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
778 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
782 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
783 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
785 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
786 struct audit_names
*n
,
787 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
788 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
789 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
790 struct audit_entry
*e
;
791 enum audit_state state
;
793 if (list_empty(list
))
796 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
797 if (audit_in_mask(&e
->rule
, ctx
->major
) &&
798 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
799 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
807 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
808 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
809 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
810 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
812 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
814 struct audit_names
*n
;
816 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
821 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
822 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
828 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
829 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_take_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
833 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
837 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
840 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
841 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
844 * This is actually a test for:
845 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
846 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
848 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
850 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
851 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
852 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
853 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
855 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
857 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
858 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
859 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
862 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
866 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context
*context
)
868 kfree(context
->proctitle
.value
);
869 context
->proctitle
.value
= NULL
;
870 context
->proctitle
.len
= 0;
873 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
875 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
877 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
884 context
->name_count
= 0;
885 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
886 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
887 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
890 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
892 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
894 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
895 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
898 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
899 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
904 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
906 struct audit_context
*context
;
908 context
= kzalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
);
911 context
->state
= state
;
912 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
913 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
914 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
919 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
922 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
923 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
924 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
927 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
929 struct audit_context
*context
;
930 enum audit_state state
;
933 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
934 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
936 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
937 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
) {
938 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
942 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
944 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
947 context
->filterkey
= key
;
949 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
950 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
954 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
956 audit_free_names(context
);
957 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
958 free_tree_refs(context
);
959 audit_free_aux(context
);
960 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
961 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
962 audit_proctitle_free(context
);
966 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
967 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
970 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
975 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
979 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
980 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
981 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
983 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
984 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
987 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
988 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
991 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
992 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
998 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
999 struct audit_buffer
**ab
)
1013 const char __user
*p
= (const char __user
*)current
->mm
->arg_start
;
1015 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1016 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1017 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1020 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1021 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1022 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1023 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1024 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
> 7500);
1025 len_max
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1027 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1028 buf_head
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1030 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1035 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", context
->execve
.argc
);
1040 require_data
= true;
1045 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1046 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1047 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1048 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1049 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1050 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1051 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1053 len_full
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1055 /* read more data from userspace */
1057 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1058 if (buf
!= buf_head
) {
1059 memmove(buf_head
, buf
, len_buf
);
1063 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1064 len_tmp
= strncpy_from_user(&buf_head
[len_buf
], p
,
1066 if (len_tmp
== -EFAULT
) {
1067 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1068 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1070 } else if (len_tmp
== (len_max
- len_buf
)) {
1071 /* buffer is not large enough */
1072 require_data
= true;
1073 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1074 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1075 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1076 * consistent record encoding */
1078 len_full
= len_full
* 2;
1081 require_data
= false;
1083 encode
= audit_string_contains_control(
1085 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1086 if (len_full
< len_max
)
1087 len_full
= (encode
?
1088 len_tmp
* 2 : len_tmp
);
1092 buf_head
[len_buf
] = '\0';
1094 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1095 len_abuf
= (encode
? len_buf
* 2 : len_buf
+ 2);
1098 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1100 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1101 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1102 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1104 if ((sizeof(abuf
) + 8) > len_rem
) {
1107 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
,
1108 GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1113 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1115 if (require_data
|| (iter
> 0) ||
1116 ((len_abuf
+ sizeof(abuf
)) > len_rem
)) {
1118 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1119 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1123 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1124 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1125 " a%d[%d]=", arg
, iter
++);
1127 len_tmp
+= snprintf(&abuf
[len_tmp
],
1128 sizeof(abuf
) - len_tmp
,
1130 WARN_ON(len_tmp
>= sizeof(abuf
));
1131 abuf
[sizeof(abuf
) - 1] = '\0';
1133 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1134 audit_log_format(*ab
, "%s", abuf
);
1138 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1139 len_tmp
= len_rem
/ 2; /* encoding */
1140 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1141 len_rem
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1142 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
* 2;
1144 if (len_abuf
> len_rem
)
1145 len_tmp
= len_rem
- 2; /* quotes */
1146 audit_log_n_string(*ab
, buf
, len_tmp
);
1147 len_rem
-= len_tmp
+ 2;
1148 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1149 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1150 len_abuf
-= len_tmp
;
1156 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1157 if ((len_buf
== 0) && !require_data
) {
1161 require_data
= true;
1164 } while (arg
< context
->execve
.argc
);
1166 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1172 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1174 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1177 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1181 switch (context
->type
) {
1182 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1183 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1184 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1185 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1186 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1187 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1190 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1192 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1193 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1194 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1199 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1200 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1203 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1204 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1207 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1209 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1210 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1213 audit_log_format(ab
,
1214 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1215 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1216 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1217 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1218 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1221 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1222 audit_log_format(ab
,
1223 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1224 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1225 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1226 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1227 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1228 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1229 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1231 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1232 audit_log_format(ab
,
1233 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1234 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1235 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1236 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1237 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1238 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1239 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1241 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1242 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1243 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1244 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1246 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1247 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1248 audit_log_format(ab
,
1249 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1251 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1252 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1253 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1255 case AUDIT_CAPSET
: {
1256 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1257 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1258 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1259 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1262 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1263 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1265 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1266 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
);
1272 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle
, int len
)
1274 char *end
= proctitle
+ len
- 1;
1275 while (end
> proctitle
&& !isprint(*end
))
1278 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1279 len
= end
- proctitle
+ 1;
1280 len
-= isprint(proctitle
[len
-1]) == 0;
1284 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1285 struct audit_context
*context
)
1289 char *msg
= "(null)";
1290 int len
= strlen(msg
);
1291 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1293 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PROCTITLE
);
1295 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1297 audit_log_format(ab
, "proctitle=");
1300 if (!context
->proctitle
.value
) {
1301 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1304 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1305 res
= get_cmdline(tsk
, buf
, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN
);
1310 res
= audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf
, res
);
1315 context
->proctitle
.value
= buf
;
1316 context
->proctitle
.len
= res
;
1318 msg
= context
->proctitle
.value
;
1319 len
= context
->proctitle
.len
;
1321 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, msg
, len
);
1325 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1327 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1328 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1329 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1330 struct audit_names
*n
;
1332 /* tsk == current */
1333 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1335 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1337 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1338 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1339 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1340 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1341 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1342 if (context
->return_valid
)
1343 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1344 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1345 context
->return_code
);
1347 audit_log_format(ab
,
1348 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1353 context
->name_count
);
1355 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1356 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1359 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1361 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1363 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1365 switch (aux
->type
) {
1367 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1368 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1369 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1370 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1371 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1372 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1373 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1374 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1375 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1376 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1377 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1378 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1386 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1388 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1389 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1391 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1392 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1397 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1398 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1400 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1401 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1402 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1407 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1408 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1410 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1411 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1412 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1414 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1416 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1420 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1421 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1422 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1423 context
->target_sessionid
,
1424 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1427 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1428 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1430 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1436 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1439 audit_log_name(context
, n
, NULL
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1442 audit_log_proctitle(tsk
, context
);
1444 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1445 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1449 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1453 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1454 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1456 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1458 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1460 struct audit_context
*context
;
1462 context
= audit_take_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1466 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1467 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1468 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1469 * in the context of the idle thread */
1470 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1471 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1472 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1473 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1474 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1476 audit_free_context(context
);
1480 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1481 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1482 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1483 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1484 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1485 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1487 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1488 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1489 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1490 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1491 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1492 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1495 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major
, unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1496 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1498 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1499 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1500 enum audit_state state
;
1505 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1510 context
->arch
= syscall_get_arch();
1511 context
->major
= major
;
1512 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1513 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1514 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1515 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1517 state
= context
->state
;
1518 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1519 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1521 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1523 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1526 context
->serial
= 0;
1527 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1528 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1529 context
->current_state
= state
;
1534 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1535 * @success: success value of the syscall
1536 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1538 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1539 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1540 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1541 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1542 * free the names stored from getname().
1544 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1546 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1547 struct audit_context
*context
;
1550 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1552 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1554 context
= audit_take_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1558 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1559 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1561 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1562 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1564 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1565 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1567 audit_free_names(context
);
1568 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1569 audit_free_aux(context
);
1570 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1571 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1572 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1573 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1574 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1576 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1577 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1578 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1579 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1581 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1584 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1586 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1587 struct audit_context
*context
;
1588 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1589 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1591 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)))
1593 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1595 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1597 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1601 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1603 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1604 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1605 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1606 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1607 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1610 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1614 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1616 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1617 struct audit_context
*context
;
1618 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1619 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1620 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1624 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1626 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1631 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1633 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(d
);
1634 if (inode
&& unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))) {
1635 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1636 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1638 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1644 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1649 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1652 /* just a race with rename */
1653 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1656 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1657 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1658 /* OK, got more space */
1659 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1663 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1664 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1665 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1672 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
,
1675 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1677 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1678 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1679 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1681 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1684 aname
->should_free
= true;
1687 aname
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1689 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1691 context
->name_count
++;
1696 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1697 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1699 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1700 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1701 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1704 __audit_reusename(const __user
char *uptr
)
1706 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1707 struct audit_names
*n
;
1709 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1712 if (n
->name
->uptr
== uptr
) {
1721 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1722 * @name: name to add
1724 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1725 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1727 void __audit_getname(struct filename
*name
)
1729 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1730 struct audit_names
*n
;
1732 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1735 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1740 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1744 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1745 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1749 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1750 * @name: name being audited
1751 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1752 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1754 void __audit_inode(struct filename
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1757 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1758 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1759 struct audit_names
*n
;
1760 bool parent
= flags
& AUDIT_INODE_PARENT
;
1762 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1769 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1770 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1775 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1776 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1779 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1784 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1786 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1787 if (n
->ino
!= inode
->i_ino
||
1788 n
->dev
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
)
1790 } else if (n
->name
) {
1791 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1792 if (strcmp(n
->name
->name
, name
->name
))
1795 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1798 /* match the correct record type */
1800 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
||
1801 n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1804 if (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
)
1810 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
1811 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
);
1821 n
->name_len
= n
->name
? parent_len(n
->name
->name
) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1822 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
1823 if (flags
& AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN
)
1826 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1827 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL
;
1829 handle_path(dentry
);
1830 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
1833 void __audit_file(const struct file
*file
)
1835 __audit_inode(NULL
, file
->f_path
.dentry
, 0);
1839 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1840 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1841 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1842 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1844 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1845 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1846 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1847 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1848 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1849 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1850 * unsuccessful attempts.
1852 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode
*parent
,
1853 const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1854 const unsigned char type
)
1856 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1857 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1858 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
1859 struct audit_names
*n
, *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
1861 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
1867 /* look for a parent entry first */
1868 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1870 (n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
&&
1871 n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
1874 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&& n
->dev
== parent
->i_sb
->s_dev
&&
1875 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
,
1876 n
->name
->name
, n
->name_len
)) {
1877 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1878 n
->type
= AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
;
1884 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1885 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1886 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1888 (n
->type
!= type
&& n
->type
!= AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
))
1891 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
->name
) ||
1892 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
->name
,
1894 found_parent
->name_len
:
1896 if (n
->type
== AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN
)
1903 if (!found_parent
) {
1904 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1905 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT
);
1908 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
1912 found_child
= audit_alloc_name(context
, type
);
1916 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1917 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1918 * audit_free_names() */
1920 found_child
->name
= found_parent
->name
;
1921 found_child
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1922 found_child
->name
->refcnt
++;
1927 audit_copy_inode(found_child
, dentry
, inode
);
1929 found_child
->ino
= AUDIT_INO_UNSET
;
1931 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
1934 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1935 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1936 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1937 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1939 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1941 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
1942 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
1944 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
1947 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
1948 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
1949 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
1950 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
1953 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
1958 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1959 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1961 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid
)
1963 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1964 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current
))
1966 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1967 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
))
1969 /* it is set, you need permission */
1970 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
))
1972 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1973 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID
) && uid_valid(loginuid
))
1978 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid
, kuid_t kloginuid
,
1979 unsigned int oldsessionid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
1982 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1983 uid_t uid
, oldloginuid
, loginuid
;
1984 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
1989 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
1993 uid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, task_uid(current
));
1994 oldloginuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, koldloginuid
);
1995 loginuid
= from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, kloginuid
),
1996 tty
= audit_get_tty(current
);
1998 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current
), uid
);
1999 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2000 audit_log_format(ab
, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
2001 oldloginuid
, loginuid
, tty
? tty_name(tty
) : "(none)",
2002 oldsessionid
, sessionid
, !rc
);
2008 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2009 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2013 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2015 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid
)
2017 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
2018 unsigned int oldsessionid
, sessionid
= (unsigned int)-1;
2022 oldloginuid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2023 oldsessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2025 rc
= audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid
);
2029 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2030 if (uid_valid(loginuid
))
2031 sessionid
= (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2033 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2034 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2036 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid
, loginuid
, oldsessionid
, sessionid
, rc
);
2041 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2044 * @attr: queue attributes
2047 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2049 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2052 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2054 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2056 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2057 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2059 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2063 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2064 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2065 * @msg_len: Message length
2066 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2067 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2070 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2071 const struct timespec
*abs_timeout
)
2073 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2074 struct timespec
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2077 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2079 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2081 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2082 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2083 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2085 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2089 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2090 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2091 * @notification: Notification event
2095 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2097 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2100 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2102 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2104 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2105 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2109 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2110 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2114 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2116 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2117 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2118 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2119 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2123 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2124 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2127 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2129 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2130 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2131 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2132 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2133 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2134 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2135 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2139 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2140 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2141 * @uid: msgq user id
2142 * @gid: msgq group id
2143 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2145 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2147 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2149 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2151 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2152 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2153 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2154 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2155 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2158 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2160 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2162 context
->type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2163 context
->execve
.argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2168 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2169 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2173 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2175 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2177 if (nargs
<= 0 || nargs
> AUDITSC_ARGS
|| !args
)
2179 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2180 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2181 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2186 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2187 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2188 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2191 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2193 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2194 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2195 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2199 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2200 * @len: data length in user space
2201 * @a: data address in kernel space
2203 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2205 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2207 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2209 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2210 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2213 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2216 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2217 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2221 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2223 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2225 context
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2226 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2227 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2228 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2229 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2230 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2234 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2235 * @sig: signal value
2236 * @t: task being signaled
2238 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2239 * and uid that is doing that.
2241 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2243 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2244 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2245 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2246 kuid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2248 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2249 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
) {
2250 audit_sig_pid
= task_tgid_nr(tsk
);
2251 if (uid_valid(tsk
->loginuid
))
2252 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2254 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2255 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2257 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2261 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2262 * in audit_context */
2263 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2264 ctx
->target_pid
= task_tgid_nr(t
);
2265 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2266 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2267 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2268 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2269 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2273 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2274 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2275 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2279 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2280 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2281 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2283 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2285 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = task_tgid_nr(t
);
2286 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2287 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2288 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2289 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2290 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2297 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2298 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2299 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2300 * @old: the old credentials
2302 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2303 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2307 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2308 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2310 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2311 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2312 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2314 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2318 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2319 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2320 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2322 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
, &vcaps
);
2324 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2325 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2326 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2327 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2329 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2330 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2331 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2333 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2334 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2335 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2340 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2341 * @new: the new credentials
2342 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2344 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2345 * audit system if applicable
2347 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2349 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2350 context
->capset
.pid
= task_tgid_nr(current
);
2351 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2352 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2353 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2354 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2357 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2359 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2360 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2361 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2362 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2365 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
2369 unsigned int sessionid
;
2370 char comm
[sizeof(current
->comm
)];
2372 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2373 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2374 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2376 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2377 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2378 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2379 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2381 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2382 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current
));
2383 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, get_task_comm(comm
, current
));
2384 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab
, current
->mm
);
2388 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2389 * @signr: signal value
2391 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2392 * should record the event for investigation.
2394 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2396 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2401 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2404 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2408 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2412 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2414 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2416 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SECCOMP
);
2420 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2421 signr
, syscall_get_arch(), syscall
,
2422 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current
), code
);
2426 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2428 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2429 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2431 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;