?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
[PATCH] remove HASH_HIGHMEM
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blobab97e51012325b24191ec5a6f2c1e2514968dd02
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/fs.h>
50 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/mm.h>
52 #include <linux/module.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/selinux.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
73
74 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
75 extern int audit_enabled;
76
77 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
78 * for saving names from getname(). */
79 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
80
81 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
82 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
83 * path_lookup. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
85
86 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
87 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
88
89 /* number of audit rules */
90 int audit_n_rules;
91
92 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
93 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
94 * pointers at syscall exit time).
95 *
96 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
97 struct audit_names {
98 const char *name;
99 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
100 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
101 unsigned long ino;
102 dev_t dev;
103 umode_t mode;
104 uid_t uid;
105 gid_t gid;
106 dev_t rdev;
107 u32 osid;
108 };
109
110 struct audit_aux_data {
111 struct audit_aux_data *next;
112 int type;
113 };
114
115 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
116
117 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open {
118 struct audit_aux_data d;
119 int oflag;
120 mode_t mode;
121 struct mq_attr attr;
122 };
123
124 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 mqd_t mqdes;
127 size_t msg_len;
128 unsigned int msg_prio;
129 struct timespec abs_timeout;
130 };
131
132 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify {
133 struct audit_aux_data d;
134 mqd_t mqdes;
135 struct sigevent notification;
136 };
137
138 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr {
139 struct audit_aux_data d;
140 mqd_t mqdes;
141 struct mq_attr mqstat;
142 };
143
144 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
145 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 struct ipc_perm p;
147 unsigned long qbytes;
148 uid_t uid;
149 gid_t gid;
150 mode_t mode;
151 u32 osid;
152 };
153
154 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 int argc;
157 int envc;
158 char mem[0];
159 };
160
161 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
162 struct audit_aux_data d;
163 int nargs;
164 unsigned long args[0];
165 };
166
167 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
168 struct audit_aux_data d;
169 int len;
170 char a[0];
171 };
172
173 struct audit_aux_data_path {
174 struct audit_aux_data d;
175 struct dentry *dentry;
176 struct vfsmount *mnt;
177 };
178
179 /* The per-task audit context. */
180 struct audit_context {
181 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
182 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
183 enum audit_state state;
184 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
185 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
186 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
187 int major; /* syscall number */
188 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
189 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
190 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
191 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
192 int name_count;
193 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
194 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
195 struct dentry * pwd;
196 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
197 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
198 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
199
200 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
201 pid_t pid, ppid;
202 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
203 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
204 unsigned long personality;
205 int arch;
206
207 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
208 int put_count;
209 int ino_count;
210 #endif
211 };
212
213 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
214 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
215 {
216 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
217 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
218 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
219 return n & mask;
220 }
221
222 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
223 {
224 unsigned n = ctx->major;
225 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
226 case 0: /* native */
227 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
228 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
229 return 1;
230 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
231 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
232 return 1;
233 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
234 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
235 return 1;
236 return 0;
237 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
238 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
239 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
240 return 1;
241 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
242 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
243 return 1;
244 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
245 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
246 return 1;
247 return 0;
248 case 2: /* open */
249 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
250 case 3: /* openat */
251 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
252 case 4: /* socketcall */
253 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
254 case 5: /* execve */
255 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
256 default:
257 return 0;
258 }
259 }
260
261 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
262 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
263 * otherwise. */
264 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
265 struct audit_krule *rule,
266 struct audit_context *ctx,
267 struct audit_names *name,
268 enum audit_state *state)
269 {
270 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
271 u32 sid;
272
273 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
274 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
275 int result = 0;
276
277 switch (f->type) {
278 case AUDIT_PID:
279 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
280 break;
281 case AUDIT_PPID:
282 if (ctx) {
283 if (!ctx->ppid)
284 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
285 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
286 }
287 break;
288 case AUDIT_UID:
289 result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
290 break;
291 case AUDIT_EUID:
292 result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
293 break;
294 case AUDIT_SUID:
295 result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
296 break;
297 case AUDIT_FSUID:
298 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
299 break;
300 case AUDIT_GID:
301 result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
302 break;
303 case AUDIT_EGID:
304 result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
305 break;
306 case AUDIT_SGID:
307 result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
308 break;
309 case AUDIT_FSGID:
310 result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
311 break;
312 case AUDIT_PERS:
313 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
314 break;
315 case AUDIT_ARCH:
316 if (ctx)
317 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
318 break;
319
320 case AUDIT_EXIT:
321 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
322 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
323 break;
324 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
325 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
326 if (f->val)
327 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
328 else
329 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
330 }
331 break;
332 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
333 if (name)
334 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
335 f->op, f->val);
336 else if (ctx) {
337 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
338 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
339 ++result;
340 break;
341 }
342 }
343 }
344 break;
345 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
346 if (name)
347 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
348 f->op, f->val);
349 else if (ctx) {
350 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
351 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
352 ++result;
353 break;
354 }
355 }
356 }
357 break;
358 case AUDIT_INODE:
359 if (name)
360 result = (name->ino == f->val);
361 else if (ctx) {
362 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
363 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
364 ++result;
365 break;
366 }
367 }
368 }
369 break;
370 case AUDIT_WATCH:
371 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
372 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
373 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
374 break;
375 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
376 result = 0;
377 if (ctx)
378 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
379 break;
380 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
381 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
382 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
383 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
384 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
385 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
386 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
387 match for now to avoid losing information that
388 may be wanted. An error message will also be
389 logged upon error */
390 if (f->se_rule) {
391 if (need_sid) {
392 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
393 need_sid = 0;
394 }
395 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
396 f->op,
397 f->se_rule,
398 ctx);
399 }
400 break;
401 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
402 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
403 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
404 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
405 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
406 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
407 also applies here */
408 if (f->se_rule) {
409 /* Find files that match */
410 if (name) {
411 result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
412 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
413 f->se_rule, ctx);
414 } else if (ctx) {
415 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
416 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
417 ctx->names[j].osid,
418 f->type, f->op,
419 f->se_rule, ctx)) {
420 ++result;
421 break;
422 }
423 }
424 }
425 /* Find ipc objects that match */
426 if (ctx) {
427 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
428 for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
429 aux = aux->next) {
430 if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
431 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
432 if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
433 ++result;
434 break;
435 }
436 }
437 }
438 }
439 }
440 break;
441 case AUDIT_ARG0:
442 case AUDIT_ARG1:
443 case AUDIT_ARG2:
444 case AUDIT_ARG3:
445 if (ctx)
446 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
447 break;
448 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
449 /* ignore this field for filtering */
450 result = 1;
451 break;
452 case AUDIT_PERM:
453 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
454 break;
455 }
456
457 if (!result)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 if (rule->filterkey)
461 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
462 switch (rule->action) {
463 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
464 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
465 }
466 return 1;
467 }
468
469 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
470 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
471 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
472 */
473 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
474 {
475 struct audit_entry *e;
476 enum audit_state state;
477
478 rcu_read_lock();
479 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
480 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
481 rcu_read_unlock();
482 return state;
483 }
484 }
485 rcu_read_unlock();
486 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
487 }
488
489 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
490 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
491 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
492 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
493 */
494 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
495 struct audit_context *ctx,
496 struct list_head *list)
497 {
498 struct audit_entry *e;
499 enum audit_state state;
500
501 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
502 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
503
504 rcu_read_lock();
505 if (!list_empty(list)) {
506 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
507 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
508
509 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
510 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
511 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
512 &state)) {
513 rcu_read_unlock();
514 return state;
515 }
516 }
517 }
518 rcu_read_unlock();
519 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
520 }
521
522 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
523 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
524 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
525 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
526 */
527 enum audit_state audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
528 struct audit_context *ctx)
529 {
530 int i;
531 struct audit_entry *e;
532 enum audit_state state;
533
534 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
535 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
536
537 rcu_read_lock();
538 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
539 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
540 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
541 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
542 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
543 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
544
545 if (list_empty(list))
546 continue;
547
548 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
549 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
550 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
551 rcu_read_unlock();
552 return state;
553 }
554 }
555 }
556 rcu_read_unlock();
557 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
558 }
559
560 void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
561 {
562 ctx->auditable = 1;
563 }
564
565 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
566 int return_valid,
567 int return_code)
568 {
569 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
570
571 if (likely(!context))
572 return NULL;
573 context->return_valid = return_valid;
574 context->return_code = return_code;
575
576 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
577 enum audit_state state;
578
579 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
580 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
581 context->auditable = 1;
582 goto get_context;
583 }
584
585 state = audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
586 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
587 context->auditable = 1;
588
589 }
590
591 get_context:
592
593 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
594 return context;
595 }
596
597 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
598 {
599 int i;
600
601 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
602 if (context->auditable
603 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
604 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
605 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
606 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
607 __FILE__, __LINE__,
608 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
609 context->name_count, context->put_count,
610 context->ino_count);
611 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
612 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
613 context->names[i].name,
614 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
615 }
616 dump_stack();
617 return;
618 }
619 #endif
620 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
621 context->put_count = 0;
622 context->ino_count = 0;
623 #endif
624
625 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
626 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
627 __putname(context->names[i].name);
628 }
629 context->name_count = 0;
630 if (context->pwd)
631 dput(context->pwd);
632 if (context->pwdmnt)
633 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
634 context->pwd = NULL;
635 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
636 }
637
638 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
639 {
640 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
641
642 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
643 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
644 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
645 dput(axi->dentry);
646 mntput(axi->mnt);
647 }
648
649 context->aux = aux->next;
650 kfree(aux);
651 }
652 }
653
654 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
655 enum audit_state state)
656 {
657 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
658
659 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
660 context->state = state;
661 context->loginuid = loginuid;
662 }
663
664 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
665 {
666 struct audit_context *context;
667
668 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
669 return NULL;
670 audit_zero_context(context, state);
671 return context;
672 }
673
674 /**
675 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
676 * @tsk: task
677 *
678 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
679 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
680 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
681 * needed.
682 */
683 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
684 {
685 struct audit_context *context;
686 enum audit_state state;
687
688 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
689 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
690
691 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
692 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
693 return 0;
694
695 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
696 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
697 return -ENOMEM;
698 }
699
700 /* Preserve login uid */
701 context->loginuid = -1;
702 if (current->audit_context)
703 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
704
705 tsk->audit_context = context;
706 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
707 return 0;
708 }
709
710 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
711 {
712 struct audit_context *previous;
713 int count = 0;
714
715 do {
716 previous = context->previous;
717 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
718 ++count;
719 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
720 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
721 context->serial, context->major,
722 context->name_count, count);
723 }
724 audit_free_names(context);
725 audit_free_aux(context);
726 kfree(context->filterkey);
727 kfree(context);
728 context = previous;
729 } while (context);
730 if (count >= 10)
731 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
732 }
733
734 static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
735 {
736 char *ctx = NULL;
737 ssize_t len = 0;
738
739 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
740 if (len < 0) {
741 if (len != -EINVAL)
742 goto error_path;
743 return;
744 }
745
746 ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
747 if (!ctx)
748 goto error_path;
749
750 len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
751 if (len < 0 )
752 goto error_path;
753
754 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
755 return;
756
757 error_path:
758 kfree(ctx);
759 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
760 return;
761 }
762
763 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
764 {
765 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
766 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
767 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
768
769 /* tsk == current */
770
771 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
772 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
773 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
774
775 if (mm) {
776 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
777 vma = mm->mmap;
778 while (vma) {
779 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
780 vma->vm_file) {
781 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
782 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
783 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
784 break;
785 }
786 vma = vma->vm_next;
787 }
788 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
789 }
790 audit_log_task_context(ab);
791 }
792
793 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
794 {
795 int i, call_panic = 0;
796 struct audit_buffer *ab;
797 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
798 const char *tty;
799
800 /* tsk == current */
801 context->pid = tsk->pid;
802 if (!context->ppid)
803 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
804 context->uid = tsk->uid;
805 context->gid = tsk->gid;
806 context->euid = tsk->euid;
807 context->suid = tsk->suid;
808 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
809 context->egid = tsk->egid;
810 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
811 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
812 context->personality = tsk->personality;
813
814 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
815 if (!ab)
816 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
817 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
818 context->arch, context->major);
819 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
820 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
821 if (context->return_valid)
822 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
823 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
824 context->return_code);
825
826 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
827 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
828 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
829 else
830 tty = "(none)";
831 audit_log_format(ab,
832 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
833 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
834 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
835 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
836 context->argv[0],
837 context->argv[1],
838 context->argv[2],
839 context->argv[3],
840 context->name_count,
841 context->ppid,
842 context->pid,
843 context->loginuid,
844 context->uid,
845 context->gid,
846 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
847 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
848
849 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
850
851 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
852 if (context->filterkey) {
853 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
854 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
855 } else
856 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
857 audit_log_end(ab);
858
859 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
860
861 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
862 if (!ab)
863 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
864
865 switch (aux->type) {
866 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
867 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *axi = (void *)aux;
868 audit_log_format(ab,
869 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
870 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
871 axi->oflag, axi->mode, axi->attr.mq_flags,
872 axi->attr.mq_maxmsg, axi->attr.mq_msgsize,
873 axi->attr.mq_curmsgs);
874 break; }
875
876 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
877 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *axi = (void *)aux;
878 audit_log_format(ab,
879 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
880 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
881 axi->mqdes, axi->msg_len, axi->msg_prio,
882 axi->abs_timeout.tv_sec, axi->abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
883 break; }
884
885 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
886 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *axi = (void *)aux;
887 audit_log_format(ab,
888 "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
889 axi->mqdes,
890 axi->notification.sigev_signo);
891 break; }
892
893 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
894 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *axi = (void *)aux;
895 audit_log_format(ab,
896 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
897 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
898 axi->mqdes,
899 axi->mqstat.mq_flags, axi->mqstat.mq_maxmsg,
900 axi->mqstat.mq_msgsize, axi->mqstat.mq_curmsgs);
901 break; }
902
903 case AUDIT_IPC: {
904 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
905 audit_log_format(ab,
906 "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
907 axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
908 if (axi->osid != 0) {
909 char *ctx = NULL;
910 u32 len;
911 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
912 axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
913 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
914 axi->osid);
915 call_panic = 1;
916 } else
917 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
918 kfree(ctx);
919 }
920 break; }
921
922 case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
923 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
924 audit_log_format(ab,
925 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x",
926 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
927 break; }
928
929 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
930 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
931 int i;
932 const char *p;
933 for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) {
934 audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i);
935 p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
936 audit_log_format(ab, "\n");
937 }
938 break; }
939
940 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
941 int i;
942 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
943 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
944 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
945 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
946 break; }
947
948 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
949 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
950
951 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
952 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
953 break; }
954
955 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
956 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
957 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
958 break; }
959
960 }
961 audit_log_end(ab);
962 }
963
964 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
965 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
966 if (ab) {
967 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
968 audit_log_end(ab);
969 }
970 }
971 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
972 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
973
974 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
975 if (!ab)
976 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
977
978 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
979
980 if (n->name) {
981 switch(n->name_len) {
982 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
983 /* log the full path */
984 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
985 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
986 break;
987 case 0:
988 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
989 * directory component is the cwd */
990 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", context->pwd,
991 context->pwdmnt);
992 break;
993 default:
994 /* log the name's directory component */
995 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
996 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name_len,
997 n->name);
998 }
999 } else
1000 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1001
1002 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1003 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1004 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1005 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1006 n->ino,
1007 MAJOR(n->dev),
1008 MINOR(n->dev),
1009 n->mode,
1010 n->uid,
1011 n->gid,
1012 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1013 MINOR(n->rdev));
1014 }
1015 if (n->osid != 0) {
1016 char *ctx = NULL;
1017 u32 len;
1018 if (selinux_sid_to_string(
1019 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1020 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1021 call_panic = 2;
1022 } else
1023 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1024 kfree(ctx);
1025 }
1026
1027 audit_log_end(ab);
1028 }
1029 if (call_panic)
1030 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1031 }
1032
1033 /**
1034 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1035 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1036 *
1037 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1038 */
1039 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1040 {
1041 struct audit_context *context;
1042
1043 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1044 if (likely(!context))
1045 return;
1046
1047 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1048 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1049 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1050 * in the context of the idle thread */
1051 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1052 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1053 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1054
1055 audit_free_context(context);
1056 }
1057
1058 /**
1059 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1060 * @tsk: task being audited
1061 * @arch: architecture type
1062 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1063 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1064 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1065 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1066 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1067 *
1068 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1069 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1070 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1071 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1072 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1073 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1074 * be written).
1075 */
1076 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1077 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1078 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1079 {
1080 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1081 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1082 enum audit_state state;
1083
1084 BUG_ON(!context);
1085
1086 /*
1087 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1088 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1089 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1090 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1091 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1092 *
1093 * i386 no
1094 * x86_64 no
1095 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1096 *
1097 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1098 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1099 */
1100 if (context->in_syscall) {
1101 struct audit_context *newctx;
1102
1103 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1104 printk(KERN_ERR
1105 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1106 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1107 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1108 #endif
1109 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1110 if (newctx) {
1111 newctx->previous = context;
1112 context = newctx;
1113 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1114 } else {
1115 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1116 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1117 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1118 * to abandon auditing. */
1119 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1120 }
1121 }
1122 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1123
1124 if (!audit_enabled)
1125 return;
1126
1127 context->arch = arch;
1128 context->major = major;
1129 context->argv[0] = a1;
1130 context->argv[1] = a2;
1131 context->argv[2] = a3;
1132 context->argv[3] = a4;
1133
1134 state = context->state;
1135 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1136 if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
1137 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1138 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1139 return;
1140
1141 context->serial = 0;
1142 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1143 context->in_syscall = 1;
1144 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
1145 context->ppid = 0;
1146 }
1147
1148 /**
1149 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1150 * @tsk: task being audited
1151 * @valid: success/failure flag
1152 * @return_code: syscall return value
1153 *
1154 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1155 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1156 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1157 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1158 * free the names stored from getname().
1159 */
1160 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1161 {
1162 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1163 struct audit_context *context;
1164
1165 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1166
1167 if (likely(!context))
1168 return;
1169
1170 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
1171 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1172
1173 context->in_syscall = 0;
1174 context->auditable = 0;
1175
1176 if (context->previous) {
1177 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1178 context->previous = NULL;
1179 audit_free_context(context);
1180 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1181 } else {
1182 audit_free_names(context);
1183 audit_free_aux(context);
1184 kfree(context->filterkey);
1185 context->filterkey = NULL;
1186 tsk->audit_context = context;
1187 }
1188 }
1189
1190 /**
1191 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1192 * @name: name to add
1193 *
1194 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1195 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1196 */
1197 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1198 {
1199 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1200
1201 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1202 return;
1203
1204 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1205 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1206 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1207 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1208 dump_stack();
1209 #endif
1210 return;
1211 }
1212 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1213 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1214 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1215 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1216 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1217 ++context->name_count;
1218 if (!context->pwd) {
1219 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1220 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1221 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1222 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1223 }
1224
1225 }
1226
1227 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1228 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1229 *
1230 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1231 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1232 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1233 */
1234 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1235 {
1236 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1237
1238 BUG_ON(!context);
1239 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1240 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1241 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1242 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1243 if (context->name_count) {
1244 int i;
1245 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1246 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1247 context->names[i].name,
1248 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1249 }
1250 #endif
1251 __putname(name);
1252 }
1253 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1254 else {
1255 ++context->put_count;
1256 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1257 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1258 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1259 " put_count=%d\n",
1260 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1261 context->serial, context->major,
1262 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1263 context->put_count);
1264 dump_stack();
1265 }
1266 }
1267 #endif
1268 }
1269
1270 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1271 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode)
1272 {
1273 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1274 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1275 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1276 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1277 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1278 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1279 selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
1280 }
1281
1282 /**
1283 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1284 * @name: name being audited
1285 * @inode: inode being audited
1286 *
1287 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1288 */
1289 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
1290 {
1291 int idx;
1292 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1293
1294 if (!context->in_syscall)
1295 return;
1296 if (context->name_count
1297 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1298 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1299 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1300 else if (context->name_count > 1
1301 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1302 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1303 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1304 else {
1305 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1306 * associated name? */
1307 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1308 return;
1309 idx = context->name_count++;
1310 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1311 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1312 ++context->ino_count;
1313 #endif
1314 }
1315 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1316 }
1317
1318 /**
1319 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1320 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1321 * @inode: inode being audited
1322 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1323 *
1324 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1325 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1326 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1327 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1328 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1329 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1330 * unsuccessful attempts.
1331 */
1332 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
1333 const struct inode *parent)
1334 {
1335 int idx;
1336 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1337 const char *found_name = NULL;
1338 int dirlen = 0;
1339
1340 if (!context->in_syscall)
1341 return;
1342
1343 /* determine matching parent */
1344 if (!dname)
1345 goto update_context;
1346 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
1347 if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
1348 const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
1349
1350 if (!name)
1351 continue;
1352
1353 if (audit_compare_dname_path(dname, name, &dirlen) == 0) {
1354 context->names[idx].name_len = dirlen;
1355 found_name = name;
1356 break;
1357 }
1358 }
1359
1360 update_context:
1361 idx = context->name_count;
1362 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1363 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing %s\n",
1364 found_name ?: "(null)");
1365 return;
1366 }
1367 context->name_count++;
1368 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1369 context->ino_count++;
1370 #endif
1371 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent directory.
1372 * All names for this context are relinquished in audit_free_names() */
1373 context->names[idx].name = found_name;
1374 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1375 context->names[idx].name_put = 0; /* don't call __putname() */
1376
1377 if (!inode)
1378 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1379 else
1380 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1381
1382 /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
1383 * provided parent. */
1384 if (!found_name) {
1385 idx = context->name_count;
1386 if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
1387 printk(KERN_DEBUG
1388 "name_count maxed and losing parent inode data: dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
1389 MAJOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1390 MINOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
1391 parent->i_ino);
1392 return;
1393 }
1394 context->name_count++;
1395 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1396 context->ino_count++;
1397 #endif
1398 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
1399 }
1400 }
1401
1402 /**
1403 * audit_inode_update - update inode info for last collected name
1404 * @inode: inode being audited
1405 *
1406 * When open() is called on an existing object with the O_CREAT flag, the inode
1407 * data audit initially collects is incorrect. This additional hook ensures
1408 * audit has the inode data for the actual object to be opened.
1409 */
1410 void __audit_inode_update(const struct inode *inode)
1411 {
1412 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1413 int idx;
1414
1415 if (!context->in_syscall || !inode)
1416 return;
1417
1418 if (context->name_count == 0) {
1419 context->name_count++;
1420 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1421 context->ino_count++;
1422 #endif
1423 }
1424 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1425
1426 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
1427 }
1428
1429 /**
1430 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1431 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1432 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1433 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1434 *
1435 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1436 */
1437 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1438 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1439 {
1440 if (!ctx->serial)
1441 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1442 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1443 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1444 *serial = ctx->serial;
1445 ctx->auditable = 1;
1446 }
1447
1448 /**
1449 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
1450 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
1451 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1452 *
1453 * Returns 0.
1454 *
1455 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1456 */
1457 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1458 {
1459 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1460
1461 if (context) {
1462 /* Only log if audit is enabled */
1463 if (context->in_syscall) {
1464 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1465
1466 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1467 if (ab) {
1468 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1469 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1470 task->pid, task->uid,
1471 context->loginuid, loginuid);
1472 audit_log_end(ab);
1473 }
1474 }
1475 context->loginuid = loginuid;
1476 }
1477 return 0;
1478 }
1479
1480 /**
1481 * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
1482 * @ctx: the audit_context
1483 *
1484 * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
1485 */
1486 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1487 {
1488 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1489 }
1490
1491 /**
1492 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
1493 * @oflag: open flag
1494 * @mode: mode bits
1495 * @u_attr: queue attributes
1496 *
1497 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1498 */
1499 int __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr __user *u_attr)
1500 {
1501 struct audit_aux_data_mq_open *ax;
1502 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1503
1504 if (!audit_enabled)
1505 return 0;
1506
1507 if (likely(!context))
1508 return 0;
1509
1510 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1511 if (!ax)
1512 return -ENOMEM;
1513
1514 if (u_attr != NULL) {
1515 if (copy_from_user(&ax->attr, u_attr, sizeof(ax->attr))) {
1516 kfree(ax);
1517 return -EFAULT;
1518 }
1519 } else
1520 memset(&ax->attr, 0, sizeof(ax->attr));
1521
1522 ax->oflag = oflag;
1523 ax->mode = mode;
1524
1525 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
1526 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1527 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530
1531 /**
1532 * __audit_mq_timedsend - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send
1533 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1534 * @msg_len: Message length
1535 * @msg_prio: Message priority
1536 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1537 *
1538 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1539 */
1540 int __audit_mq_timedsend(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
1541 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1542 {
1543 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1544 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1545
1546 if (!audit_enabled)
1547 return 0;
1548
1549 if (likely(!context))
1550 return 0;
1551
1552 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1553 if (!ax)
1554 return -ENOMEM;
1555
1556 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1557 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1558 kfree(ax);
1559 return -EFAULT;
1560 }
1561 } else
1562 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1563
1564 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1565 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1566 ax->msg_prio = msg_prio;
1567
1568 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1569 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1570 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1571 return 0;
1572 }
1573
1574 /**
1575 * __audit_mq_timedreceive - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed receive
1576 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1577 * @msg_len: Message length
1578 * @u_msg_prio: Message priority
1579 * @u_abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
1580 *
1581 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1582 */
1583 int __audit_mq_timedreceive(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len,
1584 unsigned int __user *u_msg_prio,
1585 const struct timespec __user *u_abs_timeout)
1586 {
1587 struct audit_aux_data_mq_sendrecv *ax;
1588 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1589
1590 if (!audit_enabled)
1591 return 0;
1592
1593 if (likely(!context))
1594 return 0;
1595
1596 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1597 if (!ax)
1598 return -ENOMEM;
1599
1600 if (u_msg_prio != NULL) {
1601 if (get_user(ax->msg_prio, u_msg_prio)) {
1602 kfree(ax);
1603 return -EFAULT;
1604 }
1605 } else
1606 ax->msg_prio = 0;
1607
1608 if (u_abs_timeout != NULL) {
1609 if (copy_from_user(&ax->abs_timeout, u_abs_timeout, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout))) {
1610 kfree(ax);
1611 return -EFAULT;
1612 }
1613 } else
1614 memset(&ax->abs_timeout, 0, sizeof(ax->abs_timeout));
1615
1616 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1617 ax->msg_len = msg_len;
1618
1619 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
1620 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1621 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1622 return 0;
1623 }
1624
1625 /**
1626 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
1627 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1628 * @u_notification: Notification event
1629 *
1630 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1631 */
1632
1633 int __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent __user *u_notification)
1634 {
1635 struct audit_aux_data_mq_notify *ax;
1636 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1637
1638 if (!audit_enabled)
1639 return 0;
1640
1641 if (likely(!context))
1642 return 0;
1643
1644 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1645 if (!ax)
1646 return -ENOMEM;
1647
1648 if (u_notification != NULL) {
1649 if (copy_from_user(&ax->notification, u_notification, sizeof(ax->notification))) {
1650 kfree(ax);
1651 return -EFAULT;
1652 }
1653 } else
1654 memset(&ax->notification, 0, sizeof(ax->notification));
1655
1656 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1657
1658 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
1659 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1660 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1661 return 0;
1662 }
1663
1664 /**
1665 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
1666 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
1667 * @mqstat: MQ flags
1668 *
1669 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1670 */
1671 int __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
1672 {
1673 struct audit_aux_data_mq_getsetattr *ax;
1674 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1675
1676 if (!audit_enabled)
1677 return 0;
1678
1679 if (likely(!context))
1680 return 0;
1681
1682 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1683 if (!ax)
1684 return -ENOMEM;
1685
1686 ax->mqdes = mqdes;
1687 ax->mqstat = *mqstat;
1688
1689 ax->d.type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
1690 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1691 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1692 return 0;
1693 }
1694
1695 /**
1696 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
1697 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
1698 *
1699 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1700 */
1701 int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
1702 {
1703 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1704 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1705
1706 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1707 if (!ax)
1708 return -ENOMEM;
1709
1710 ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
1711 ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
1712 ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
1713 selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
1714
1715 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1716 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1717 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1718 return 0;
1719 }
1720
1721 /**
1722 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
1723 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
1724 * @uid: msgq user id
1725 * @gid: msgq group id
1726 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
1727 *
1728 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1729 */
1730 int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1731 {
1732 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1733 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1734
1735 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1736 if (!ax)
1737 return -ENOMEM;
1738
1739 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1740 ax->uid = uid;
1741 ax->gid = gid;
1742 ax->mode = mode;
1743
1744 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
1745 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1746 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1747 return 0;
1748 }
1749
1750 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1751 {
1752 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
1753 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1754 unsigned long p, next;
1755 void *to;
1756
1757 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
1758 return 0;
1759
1760 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
1761 GFP_KERNEL);
1762 if (!ax)
1763 return -ENOMEM;
1764
1765 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
1766 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
1767 for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) {
1768 struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE];
1769 void *kaddr = kmap(page);
1770 next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1771 memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p);
1772 to += next - p;
1773 kunmap(page);
1774 }
1775
1776 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
1777 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1778 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1779 return 0;
1780 }
1781
1782
1783 /**
1784 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
1785 * @nargs: number of args
1786 * @args: args array
1787 *
1788 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1789 */
1790 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1791 {
1792 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1793 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1794
1795 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1796 return 0;
1797
1798 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1799 if (!ax)
1800 return -ENOMEM;
1801
1802 ax->nargs = nargs;
1803 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1804
1805 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1806 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1807 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1808 return 0;
1809 }
1810
1811 /**
1812 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
1813 * @len: data length in user space
1814 * @a: data address in kernel space
1815 *
1816 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1817 */
1818 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1819 {
1820 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1821 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1822
1823 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
1824 return 0;
1825
1826 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1827 if (!ax)
1828 return -ENOMEM;
1829
1830 ax->len = len;
1831 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1832
1833 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1834 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1835 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1836 return 0;
1837 }
1838
1839 /**
1840 * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
1841 * @dentry: dentry to record
1842 * @mnt: mnt to record
1843 *
1844 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
1845 *
1846 * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
1847 */
1848 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1849 {
1850 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1851 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1852
1853 if (likely(!context))
1854 return 0;
1855
1856 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1857 if (!ax)
1858 return -ENOMEM;
1859
1860 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1861 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1862
1863 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1864 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1865 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1866 return 0;
1867 }
1868
1869 /**
1870 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
1871 * @sig: signal value
1872 * @t: task being signaled
1873 *
1874 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
1875 * and uid that is doing that.
1876 */
1877 void __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1878 {
1879 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1880 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1881 extern u32 audit_sig_sid;
1882
1883 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) {
1884 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1885 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
1886 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
1887 if (ctx)
1888 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1889 else
1890 audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
1891 selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
1892 }
1893 }
Linux with added FPC-III support