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Merge remote-tracking branch 'asoc/topic/x86' into asoc-next
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blob3c8a601324a280fe9224c872f24e2995243da830
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
71
72 #include "audit.h"
73
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
78
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
81
82 /* number of audit rules */
83 int audit_n_rules;
84
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
86 int audit_signals;
87
88 struct audit_aux_data {
89 struct audit_aux_data *next;
90 int type;
91 };
92
93 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
94
95 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
96 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
97
98 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
99 struct audit_aux_data d;
100 int argc;
101 int envc;
102 struct mm_struct *mm;
103 };
104
105 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
106 struct audit_aux_data d;
107 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
108 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
109 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
113 int pid_count;
114 };
115
116 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
117 struct audit_aux_data d;
118 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
119 unsigned int fcap_ver;
120 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
121 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
122 };
123
124 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
126 pid_t pid;
127 struct audit_cap_data cap;
128 };
129
130 struct audit_tree_refs {
131 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
132 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
133 };
134
135 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
136 {
137 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
138 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
139 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
140 return n & mask;
141 }
142
143 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
144 {
145 unsigned n;
146 if (unlikely(!ctx))
147 return 0;
148 n = ctx->major;
149
150 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
151 case 0: /* native */
152 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
154 return 1;
155 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
156 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
157 return 1;
158 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
160 return 1;
161 return 0;
162 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
163 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
164 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
165 return 1;
166 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
167 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
168 return 1;
169 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
170 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
171 return 1;
172 return 0;
173 case 2: /* open */
174 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
175 case 3: /* openat */
176 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
177 case 4: /* socketcall */
178 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
179 case 5: /* execve */
180 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
181 default:
182 return 0;
183 }
184 }
185
186 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
187 {
188 struct audit_names *n;
189 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
190
191 if (unlikely(!ctx))
192 return 0;
193
194 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
195 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
196 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
197 return 1;
198 }
199
200 return 0;
201 }
202
203 /*
204 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
205 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
206 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
207 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
208 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
209 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
210 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
211 */
212
213 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
214 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
215 {
216 if (!ctx->prio) {
217 ctx->prio = 1;
218 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
219 }
220 }
221
222 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
223 {
224 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
225 int left = ctx->tree_count;
226 if (likely(left)) {
227 p->c[--left] = chunk;
228 ctx->tree_count = left;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 if (!p)
232 return 0;
233 p = p->next;
234 if (p) {
235 p->c[30] = chunk;
236 ctx->trees = p;
237 ctx->tree_count = 30;
238 return 1;
239 }
240 return 0;
241 }
242
243 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
244 {
245 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
246 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
247 if (!ctx->trees) {
248 ctx->trees = p;
249 return 0;
250 }
251 if (p)
252 p->next = ctx->trees;
253 else
254 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
255 ctx->tree_count = 31;
256 return 1;
257 }
258 #endif
259
260 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
261 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
262 {
263 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
264 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
265 int n;
266 if (!p) {
267 /* we started with empty chain */
268 p = ctx->first_trees;
269 count = 31;
270 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
271 if (!p)
272 return;
273 }
274 n = count;
275 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
276 while (n--) {
277 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
278 q->c[n] = NULL;
279 }
280 }
281 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
282 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
283 q->c[n] = NULL;
284 }
285 ctx->trees = p;
286 ctx->tree_count = count;
287 #endif
288 }
289
290 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
291 {
292 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
293 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
294 q = p->next;
295 kfree(p);
296 }
297 }
298
299 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
300 {
301 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
302 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
303 int n;
304 if (!tree)
305 return 0;
306 /* full ones */
307 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
308 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
309 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
310 return 1;
311 }
312 /* partial */
313 if (p) {
314 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
315 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
316 return 1;
317 }
318 #endif
319 return 0;
320 }
321
322 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
323 struct audit_names *name,
324 struct audit_field *f,
325 struct audit_context *ctx)
326 {
327 struct audit_names *n;
328 int rc;
329
330 if (name) {
331 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
332 if (rc)
333 return rc;
334 }
335
336 if (ctx) {
337 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
338 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
339 if (rc)
340 return rc;
341 }
342 }
343 return 0;
344 }
345
346 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
347 struct audit_names *name,
348 struct audit_field *f,
349 struct audit_context *ctx)
350 {
351 struct audit_names *n;
352 int rc;
353
354 if (name) {
355 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
356 if (rc)
357 return rc;
358 }
359
360 if (ctx) {
361 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
362 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
363 if (rc)
364 return rc;
365 }
366 }
367 return 0;
368 }
369
370 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
371 const struct cred *cred,
372 struct audit_field *f,
373 struct audit_context *ctx,
374 struct audit_names *name)
375 {
376 switch (f->val) {
377 /* process to file object comparisons */
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
379 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
381 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
383 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
385 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
387 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
389 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
391 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
393 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
395 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
396 /* uid comparisons */
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* auid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
411 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
412 /* euid comparisons */
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
414 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
416 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
417 /* suid comparisons */
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
419 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
420 /* gid comparisons */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
424 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
425 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
426 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
427 /* egid comparisons */
428 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
429 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
430 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
431 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
432 /* sgid comparison */
433 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
434 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
435 default:
436 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
437 return 0;
438 }
439 return 0;
440 }
441
442 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
443 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
444 * otherwise.
445 *
446 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
447 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
448 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
449 */
450 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
451 struct audit_krule *rule,
452 struct audit_context *ctx,
453 struct audit_names *name,
454 enum audit_state *state,
455 bool task_creation)
456 {
457 const struct cred *cred;
458 int i, need_sid = 1;
459 u32 sid;
460
461 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
462
463 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
464 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
465 struct audit_names *n;
466 int result = 0;
467
468 switch (f->type) {
469 case AUDIT_PID:
470 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
471 break;
472 case AUDIT_PPID:
473 if (ctx) {
474 if (!ctx->ppid)
475 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
476 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
477 }
478 break;
479 case AUDIT_UID:
480 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
481 break;
482 case AUDIT_EUID:
483 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
484 break;
485 case AUDIT_SUID:
486 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
487 break;
488 case AUDIT_FSUID:
489 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
490 break;
491 case AUDIT_GID:
492 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
493 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
494 if (!result)
495 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
496 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
497 if (result)
498 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
499 }
500 break;
501 case AUDIT_EGID:
502 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
503 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
504 if (!result)
505 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
506 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
507 if (result)
508 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
509 }
510 break;
511 case AUDIT_SGID:
512 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
513 break;
514 case AUDIT_FSGID:
515 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
516 break;
517 case AUDIT_PERS:
518 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
519 break;
520 case AUDIT_ARCH:
521 if (ctx)
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
523 break;
524
525 case AUDIT_EXIT:
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
530 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
531 if (f->val)
532 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
533 else
534 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
535 }
536 break;
537 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
538 if (name) {
539 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
540 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
541 ++result;
542 } else if (ctx) {
543 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
546 ++result;
547 break;
548 }
549 }
550 }
551 break;
552 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
553 if (name) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
555 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
556 ++result;
557 } else if (ctx) {
558 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
559 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
560 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
561 ++result;
562 break;
563 }
564 }
565 }
566 break;
567 case AUDIT_INODE:
568 if (name)
569 result = (name->ino == f->val);
570 else if (ctx) {
571 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
572 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
573 ++result;
574 break;
575 }
576 }
577 }
578 break;
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
580 if (name) {
581 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
582 } else if (ctx) {
583 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
584 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
585 ++result;
586 break;
587 }
588 }
589 }
590 break;
591 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
592 if (name) {
593 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
594 } else if (ctx) {
595 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
596 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
597 ++result;
598 break;
599 }
600 }
601 }
602 break;
603 case AUDIT_WATCH:
604 if (name)
605 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
606 break;
607 case AUDIT_DIR:
608 if (ctx)
609 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
610 break;
611 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
612 result = 0;
613 if (ctx)
614 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
615 break;
616 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
617 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
618 break;
619 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
620 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
621 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
622 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
623 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
624 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
625 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
626 match for now to avoid losing information that
627 may be wanted. An error message will also be
628 logged upon error */
629 if (f->lsm_rule) {
630 if (need_sid) {
631 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
632 need_sid = 0;
633 }
634 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
635 f->op,
636 f->lsm_rule,
637 ctx);
638 }
639 break;
640 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
641 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
642 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
643 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
644 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
645 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
646 also applies here */
647 if (f->lsm_rule) {
648 /* Find files that match */
649 if (name) {
650 result = security_audit_rule_match(
651 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
652 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
653 } else if (ctx) {
654 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
655 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
656 f->op, f->lsm_rule,
657 ctx)) {
658 ++result;
659 break;
660 }
661 }
662 }
663 /* Find ipc objects that match */
664 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
665 break;
666 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
667 f->type, f->op,
668 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
669 ++result;
670 }
671 break;
672 case AUDIT_ARG0:
673 case AUDIT_ARG1:
674 case AUDIT_ARG2:
675 case AUDIT_ARG3:
676 if (ctx)
677 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
678 break;
679 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
680 /* ignore this field for filtering */
681 result = 1;
682 break;
683 case AUDIT_PERM:
684 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
685 break;
686 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
687 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
688 break;
689 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
690 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
691 break;
692 }
693 if (!result)
694 return 0;
695 }
696
697 if (ctx) {
698 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
699 return 0;
700 if (rule->filterkey) {
701 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
702 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
703 }
704 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
705 }
706 switch (rule->action) {
707 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
708 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
709 }
710 return 1;
711 }
712
713 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
714 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
715 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
716 */
717 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
718 {
719 struct audit_entry *e;
720 enum audit_state state;
721
722 rcu_read_lock();
723 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
724 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
725 &state, true)) {
726 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
727 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
728 rcu_read_unlock();
729 return state;
730 }
731 }
732 rcu_read_unlock();
733 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
734 }
735
736 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
737 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
738 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
739 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
740 */
741 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
742 struct audit_context *ctx,
743 struct list_head *list)
744 {
745 struct audit_entry *e;
746 enum audit_state state;
747
748 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
749 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
750
751 rcu_read_lock();
752 if (!list_empty(list)) {
753 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
754 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
755
756 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
757 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
758 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
759 &state, false)) {
760 rcu_read_unlock();
761 ctx->current_state = state;
762 return state;
763 }
764 }
765 }
766 rcu_read_unlock();
767 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
768 }
769
770 /*
771 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
772 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
773 */
774 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
775 struct audit_names *n,
776 struct audit_context *ctx) {
777 int word, bit;
778 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
779 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
780 struct audit_entry *e;
781 enum audit_state state;
782
783 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
784 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
785
786 if (list_empty(list))
787 return 0;
788
789 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
790 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
791 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
792 ctx->current_state = state;
793 return 1;
794 }
795 }
796
797 return 0;
798 }
799
800 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
801 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
802 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
803 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
804 */
805 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
806 {
807 struct audit_names *n;
808
809 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
810 return;
811
812 rcu_read_lock();
813
814 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
815 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
816 break;
817 }
818 rcu_read_unlock();
819 }
820
821 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
822 int return_valid,
823 long return_code)
824 {
825 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
826
827 if (!context)
828 return NULL;
829 context->return_valid = return_valid;
830
831 /*
832 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
833 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
834 * signal handlers
835 *
836 * This is actually a test for:
837 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
838 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
839 *
840 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
841 */
842 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
843 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
844 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
845 context->return_code = -EINTR;
846 else
847 context->return_code = return_code;
848
849 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
850 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
851 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
852 }
853
854 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
855 return context;
856 }
857
858 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
859 {
860 struct audit_names *n, *next;
861
862 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
863 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
864 int i = 0;
865
866 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
867 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
868 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
869 __FILE__, __LINE__,
870 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
871 context->name_count, context->put_count,
872 context->ino_count);
873 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
874 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
875 n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
876 }
877 dump_stack();
878 return;
879 }
880 #endif
881 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
882 context->put_count = 0;
883 context->ino_count = 0;
884 #endif
885
886 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
887 list_del(&n->list);
888 if (n->name && n->name_put)
889 final_putname(n->name);
890 if (n->should_free)
891 kfree(n);
892 }
893 context->name_count = 0;
894 path_put(&context->pwd);
895 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
896 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
897 }
898
899 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
900 {
901 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
902
903 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
904 context->aux = aux->next;
905 kfree(aux);
906 }
907 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
908 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
909 kfree(aux);
910 }
911 }
912
913 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
914 {
915 struct audit_context *context;
916
917 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
918 if (!context)
919 return NULL;
920 context->state = state;
921 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
922 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
923 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
924 return context;
925 }
926
927 /**
928 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
929 * @tsk: task
930 *
931 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
932 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
933 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
934 * needed.
935 */
936 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
937 {
938 struct audit_context *context;
939 enum audit_state state;
940 char *key = NULL;
941
942 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
943 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
944
945 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
946 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
947 return 0;
948
949 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
950 kfree(key);
951 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
952 return -ENOMEM;
953 }
954 context->filterkey = key;
955
956 tsk->audit_context = context;
957 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
958 return 0;
959 }
960
961 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
962 {
963 audit_free_names(context);
964 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
965 free_tree_refs(context);
966 audit_free_aux(context);
967 kfree(context->filterkey);
968 kfree(context->sockaddr);
969 kfree(context);
970 }
971
972 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
973 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
974 u32 sid, char *comm)
975 {
976 struct audit_buffer *ab;
977 char *ctx = NULL;
978 u32 len;
979 int rc = 0;
980
981 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
982 if (!ab)
983 return rc;
984
985 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
986 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
987 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
988 if (sid) {
989 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
990 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
991 rc = 1;
992 } else {
993 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
994 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
995 }
996 }
997 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
998 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
999 audit_log_end(ab);
1000
1001 return rc;
1002 }
1003
1004 /*
1005 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1006 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1007 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1008 *
1009 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1010 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1011 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1012 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1013 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1014 */
1015 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1016 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1017 int arg_num,
1018 size_t *len_sent,
1019 const char __user *p,
1020 char *buf)
1021 {
1022 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1023 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1024 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1025 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1026 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1027 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1028 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1029 int ret;
1030
1031 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1032 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1033
1034 /*
1035 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1036 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1037 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1038 * any.
1039 */
1040 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1041 WARN_ON(1);
1042 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1043 return -1;
1044 }
1045
1046 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1047 do {
1048 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1049 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1050 else
1051 to_send = len_left;
1052 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1053 /*
1054 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1055 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1056 * space yet.
1057 */
1058 if (ret) {
1059 WARN_ON(1);
1060 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1061 return -1;
1062 }
1063 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1064 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1065 if (has_cntl) {
1066 /*
1067 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1068 * send half as much in each message
1069 */
1070 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1071 break;
1072 }
1073 len_left -= to_send;
1074 tmp_p += to_send;
1075 } while (len_left > 0);
1076
1077 len_left = len;
1078
1079 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1080 too_long = 1;
1081
1082 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1083 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1084 int room_left;
1085
1086 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1087 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1088 else
1089 to_send = len_left;
1090
1091 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1092 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1093 if (has_cntl)
1094 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1095 else
1096 room_left -= to_send;
1097 if (room_left < 0) {
1098 *len_sent = 0;
1099 audit_log_end(*ab);
1100 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1101 if (!*ab)
1102 return 0;
1103 }
1104
1105 /*
1106 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1107 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1108 */
1109 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1110 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1111 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1112
1113 /*
1114 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1115 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1116 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1117 */
1118 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1119 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1120 else
1121 ret = 0;
1122 if (ret) {
1123 WARN_ON(1);
1124 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1125 return -1;
1126 }
1127 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1128
1129 /* actually log it */
1130 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1131 if (too_long)
1132 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1133 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1134 if (has_cntl)
1135 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1136 else
1137 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1138
1139 p += to_send;
1140 len_left -= to_send;
1141 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1142 if (has_cntl)
1143 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1144 else
1145 *len_sent += to_send;
1146 }
1147 /* include the null we didn't log */
1148 return len + 1;
1149 }
1150
1151 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1152 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1153 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1154 {
1155 int i, len;
1156 size_t len_sent = 0;
1157 const char __user *p;
1158 char *buf;
1159
1160 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1161 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1162
1163 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1164
1165 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1166
1167 /*
1168 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1169 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1170 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1171 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1172 */
1173 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1174 if (!buf) {
1175 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1176 return;
1177 }
1178
1179 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1180 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1181 &len_sent, p, buf);
1182 if (len <= 0)
1183 break;
1184 p += len;
1185 }
1186 kfree(buf);
1187 }
1188
1189 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1190 {
1191 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1192 int i;
1193
1194 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1195 if (!ab)
1196 return;
1197
1198 switch (context->type) {
1199 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1200 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1201 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1202 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1203 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1204 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1205 break; }
1206 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1207 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1208
1209 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1210 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1211 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1212 context->ipc.mode);
1213 if (osid) {
1214 char *ctx = NULL;
1215 u32 len;
1216 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1217 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1218 *call_panic = 1;
1219 } else {
1220 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1221 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1222 }
1223 }
1224 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1225 audit_log_end(ab);
1226 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1227 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1228 if (unlikely(!ab))
1229 return;
1230 audit_log_format(ab,
1231 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1232 context->ipc.qbytes,
1233 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1234 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1235 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1236 }
1237 break; }
1238 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1239 audit_log_format(ab,
1240 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1241 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1242 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1243 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1244 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1245 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1246 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1247 break; }
1248 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1249 audit_log_format(ab,
1250 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1251 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1252 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1253 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1254 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1255 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1256 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1257 break; }
1258 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1259 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1260 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1261 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1262 break; }
1263 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1264 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1265 audit_log_format(ab,
1266 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1267 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1268 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1269 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1270 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1271 break; }
1272 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1273 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1274 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1275 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1276 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1277 break; }
1278 case AUDIT_MMAP: {
1279 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1280 context->mmap.flags);
1281 break; }
1282 }
1283 audit_log_end(ab);
1284 }
1285
1286 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1287 {
1288 int i, call_panic = 0;
1289 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1290 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1291 struct audit_names *n;
1292
1293 /* tsk == current */
1294 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1295
1296 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1297 if (!ab)
1298 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1299 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1300 context->arch, context->major);
1301 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1302 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1303 if (context->return_valid)
1304 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1305 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1306 context->return_code);
1307
1308 audit_log_format(ab,
1309 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1310 context->argv[0],
1311 context->argv[1],
1312 context->argv[2],
1313 context->argv[3],
1314 context->name_count);
1315
1316 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1317 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1318 audit_log_end(ab);
1319
1320 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1321
1322 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1323 if (!ab)
1324 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1325
1326 switch (aux->type) {
1327
1328 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1329 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1330 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1331 break; }
1332
1333 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1334 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1335 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1336 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1337 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1338 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1339 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1340 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1341 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1342 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1343 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1344 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1345 break; }
1346
1347 }
1348 audit_log_end(ab);
1349 }
1350
1351 if (context->type)
1352 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1353
1354 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1355 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1356 if (ab) {
1357 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1358 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1359 audit_log_end(ab);
1360 }
1361 }
1362
1363 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1364 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1365 if (ab) {
1366 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1367 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1368 context->sockaddr_len);
1369 audit_log_end(ab);
1370 }
1371 }
1372
1373 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1374 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1375
1376 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1377 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1378 axs->target_auid[i],
1379 axs->target_uid[i],
1380 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1381 axs->target_sid[i],
1382 axs->target_comm[i]))
1383 call_panic = 1;
1384 }
1385
1386 if (context->target_pid &&
1387 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1388 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1389 context->target_sessionid,
1390 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1391 call_panic = 1;
1392
1393 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1394 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1395 if (ab) {
1396 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1397 audit_log_end(ab);
1398 }
1399 }
1400
1401 i = 0;
1402 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1403 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1404
1405 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1406 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1407 if (ab)
1408 audit_log_end(ab);
1409 if (call_panic)
1410 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1411 }
1412
1413 /**
1414 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1415 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1416 *
1417 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1418 */
1419 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1420 {
1421 struct audit_context *context;
1422
1423 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1424 if (!context)
1425 return;
1426
1427 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1428 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1429 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1430 * in the context of the idle thread */
1431 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1432 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1433 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1434 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1435 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1436
1437 audit_free_context(context);
1438 }
1439
1440 /**
1441 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1442 * @arch: architecture type
1443 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1444 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1445 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1446 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1447 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1448 *
1449 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1450 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1451 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1452 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1453 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1454 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1455 * be written).
1456 */
1457 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1458 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1459 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1460 {
1461 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1462 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1463 enum audit_state state;
1464
1465 if (!context)
1466 return;
1467
1468 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1469
1470 if (!audit_enabled)
1471 return;
1472
1473 context->arch = arch;
1474 context->major = major;
1475 context->argv[0] = a1;
1476 context->argv[1] = a2;
1477 context->argv[2] = a3;
1478 context->argv[3] = a4;
1479
1480 state = context->state;
1481 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1482 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1483 context->prio = 0;
1484 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1485 }
1486 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1487 return;
1488
1489 context->serial = 0;
1490 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1491 context->in_syscall = 1;
1492 context->current_state = state;
1493 context->ppid = 0;
1494 }
1495
1496 /**
1497 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1498 * @success: success value of the syscall
1499 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1500 *
1501 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1502 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1503 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1504 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1505 * free the names stored from getname().
1506 */
1507 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1508 {
1509 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1510 struct audit_context *context;
1511
1512 if (success)
1513 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1514 else
1515 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1516
1517 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1518 if (!context)
1519 return;
1520
1521 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1522 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1523
1524 context->in_syscall = 0;
1525 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1526
1527 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1528 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1529
1530 audit_free_names(context);
1531 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1532 audit_free_aux(context);
1533 context->aux = NULL;
1534 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1535 context->target_pid = 0;
1536 context->target_sid = 0;
1537 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1538 context->type = 0;
1539 context->fds[0] = -1;
1540 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1541 kfree(context->filterkey);
1542 context->filterkey = NULL;
1543 }
1544 tsk->audit_context = context;
1545 }
1546
1547 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1548 {
1549 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1550 struct audit_context *context;
1551 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1552 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1553 int count;
1554 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1555 return;
1556 context = current->audit_context;
1557 p = context->trees;
1558 count = context->tree_count;
1559 rcu_read_lock();
1560 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1561 rcu_read_unlock();
1562 if (!chunk)
1563 return;
1564 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1565 return;
1566 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1567 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1568 audit_set_auditable(context);
1569 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1570 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1571 return;
1572 }
1573 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1574 #endif
1575 }
1576
1577 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1578 {
1579 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1580 struct audit_context *context;
1581 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1582 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1583 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1584 unsigned long seq;
1585 int count;
1586
1587 context = current->audit_context;
1588 p = context->trees;
1589 count = context->tree_count;
1590 retry:
1591 drop = NULL;
1592 d = dentry;
1593 rcu_read_lock();
1594 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1595 for(;;) {
1596 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1597 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1598 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1599 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1600 if (chunk) {
1601 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1602 drop = chunk;
1603 break;
1604 }
1605 }
1606 }
1607 parent = d->d_parent;
1608 if (parent == d)
1609 break;
1610 d = parent;
1611 }
1612 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1613 rcu_read_unlock();
1614 if (!drop) {
1615 /* just a race with rename */
1616 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1617 goto retry;
1618 }
1619 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1620 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1621 /* OK, got more space */
1622 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1623 goto retry;
1624 }
1625 /* too bad */
1626 printk(KERN_WARNING
1627 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1628 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1629 audit_set_auditable(context);
1630 return;
1631 }
1632 rcu_read_unlock();
1633 #endif
1634 }
1635
1636 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1637 unsigned char type)
1638 {
1639 struct audit_names *aname;
1640
1641 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1642 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1643 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1644 } else {
1645 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1646 if (!aname)
1647 return NULL;
1648 aname->should_free = true;
1649 }
1650
1651 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1652 aname->type = type;
1653 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1654
1655 context->name_count++;
1656 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1657 context->ino_count++;
1658 #endif
1659 return aname;
1660 }
1661
1662 /**
1663 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1664 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1665 *
1666 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1667 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1668 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1669 */
1670 struct filename *
1671 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1672 {
1673 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1674 struct audit_names *n;
1675
1676 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1677 if (!n->name)
1678 continue;
1679 if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
1680 return n->name;
1681 }
1682 return NULL;
1683 }
1684
1685 /**
1686 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1687 * @name: name to add
1688 *
1689 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1690 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1691 */
1692 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1693 {
1694 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1695 struct audit_names *n;
1696
1697 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1698 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1699 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1700 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1701 dump_stack();
1702 #endif
1703 return;
1704 }
1705
1706 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1707 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1708 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1709 #endif
1710
1711 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1712 if (!n)
1713 return;
1714
1715 n->name = name;
1716 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1717 n->name_put = true;
1718 name->aname = n;
1719
1720 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1721 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1722 }
1723
1724 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1725 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1726 *
1727 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1728 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1729 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1730 */
1731 void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
1732 {
1733 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1734
1735 BUG_ON(!context);
1736 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1737 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1738 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1739 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1740 if (context->name_count) {
1741 struct audit_names *n;
1742 int i = 0;
1743
1744 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1745 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
1746 n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
1747 }
1748 #endif
1749 final_putname(name);
1750 }
1751 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1752 else {
1753 ++context->put_count;
1754 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1755 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1756 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1757 " put_count=%d\n",
1758 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1759 context->serial, context->major,
1760 context->in_syscall, name->name,
1761 context->name_count, context->put_count);
1762 dump_stack();
1763 }
1764 }
1765 #endif
1766 }
1767
1768 /**
1769 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1770 * @name: name being audited
1771 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1772 * @parent: does this dentry represent the parent?
1773 */
1774 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1775 unsigned int parent)
1776 {
1777 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1778 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1779 struct audit_names *n;
1780
1781 if (!context->in_syscall)
1782 return;
1783
1784 if (!name)
1785 goto out_alloc;
1786
1787 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1788 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1789 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1790 #endif
1791 /*
1792 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1793 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1794 */
1795 n = name->aname;
1796 if (n) {
1797 if (parent) {
1798 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1799 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1800 goto out;
1801 } else {
1802 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1803 goto out;
1804 }
1805 }
1806
1807 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1808 /* does the name pointer match? */
1809 if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
1810 continue;
1811
1812 /* match the correct record type */
1813 if (parent) {
1814 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1815 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1816 goto out;
1817 } else {
1818 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1819 goto out;
1820 }
1821 }
1822
1823 out_alloc:
1824 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1825 * anonymous entry.
1826 */
1827 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
1828 if (!n)
1829 return;
1830 out:
1831 if (parent) {
1832 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1833 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1834 } else {
1835 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1836 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1837 }
1838 handle_path(dentry);
1839 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1840 }
1841
1842 /**
1843 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1844 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1845 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1846 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1847 *
1848 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1849 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1850 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1851 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1852 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1853 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1854 * unsuccessful attempts.
1855 */
1856 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1857 const struct dentry *dentry,
1858 const unsigned char type)
1859 {
1860 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1861 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1862 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1863 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1864
1865 if (!context->in_syscall)
1866 return;
1867
1868 if (inode)
1869 handle_one(inode);
1870
1871 /* look for a parent entry first */
1872 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1873 if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1874 continue;
1875
1876 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1877 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1878 found_parent = n;
1879 break;
1880 }
1881 }
1882
1883 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1884 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1885 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1886 if (!n->name || n->type != type)
1887 continue;
1888
1889 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1890 if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
1891 continue;
1892
1893 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1894 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1895 found_parent ?
1896 found_parent->name_len :
1897 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
1898 found_child = n;
1899 break;
1900 }
1901 }
1902
1903 if (!found_parent) {
1904 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1905 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1906 if (!n)
1907 return;
1908 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1909 }
1910
1911 if (!found_child) {
1912 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1913 if (!found_child)
1914 return;
1915
1916 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1917 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1918 * audit_free_names() */
1919 if (found_parent) {
1920 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1921 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1922 /* don't call __putname() */
1923 found_child->name_put = false;
1924 }
1925 }
1926 if (inode)
1927 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1928 else
1929 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1930 }
1931 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1932
1933 /**
1934 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1935 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1936 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1937 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1938 *
1939 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1940 */
1941 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1942 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1943 {
1944 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1945 return 0;
1946 if (!ctx->serial)
1947 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1948 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1949 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1950 *serial = ctx->serial;
1951 if (!ctx->prio) {
1952 ctx->prio = 1;
1953 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1954 }
1955 return 1;
1956 }
1957
1958 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1959 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1960
1961 /**
1962 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
1963 * @loginuid: loginuid value
1964 *
1965 * Returns 0.
1966 *
1967 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
1968 */
1969 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
1970 {
1971 struct task_struct *task = current;
1972 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
1973 unsigned int sessionid;
1974
1975 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
1976 if (audit_loginuid_set(task))
1977 return -EPERM;
1978 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
1979 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1980 return -EPERM;
1981 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
1982
1983 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
1984 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
1985 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1986
1987 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1988 if (ab) {
1989 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1990 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
1991 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
1992 task->pid,
1993 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(task)),
1994 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task->loginuid),
1995 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid),
1996 task->sessionid, sessionid);
1997 audit_log_end(ab);
1998 }
1999 }
2000 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2001 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2002 return 0;
2003 }
2004
2005 /**
2006 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2007 * @oflag: open flag
2008 * @mode: mode bits
2009 * @attr: queue attributes
2010 *
2011 */
2012 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2013 {
2014 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2015
2016 if (attr)
2017 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2018 else
2019 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2020
2021 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2022 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2023
2024 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2025 }
2026
2027 /**
2028 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2029 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2030 * @msg_len: Message length
2031 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2032 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2033 *
2034 */
2035 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2036 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2037 {
2038 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2039 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2040
2041 if (abs_timeout)
2042 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2043 else
2044 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2045
2046 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2047 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2048 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2049
2050 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2051 }
2052
2053 /**
2054 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2055 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2056 * @notification: Notification event
2057 *
2058 */
2059
2060 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2061 {
2062 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2063
2064 if (notification)
2065 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2066 else
2067 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2068
2069 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2070 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2071 }
2072
2073 /**
2074 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2075 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2076 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2077 *
2078 */
2079 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2080 {
2081 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2082 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2083 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2084 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2085 }
2086
2087 /**
2088 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2089 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2090 *
2091 */
2092 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2093 {
2094 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2095 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2096 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2097 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2098 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2099 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2100 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2101 }
2102
2103 /**
2104 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2105 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2106 * @uid: msgq user id
2107 * @gid: msgq group id
2108 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2109 *
2110 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2111 */
2112 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2113 {
2114 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2115
2116 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2117 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2118 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2119 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2120 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2121 }
2122
2123 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2124 {
2125 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2126 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2127
2128 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2129 if (!ax)
2130 return -ENOMEM;
2131
2132 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2133 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2134 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2135 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2136 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2137 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140
2141
2142 /**
2143 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2144 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2145 * @args: args array
2146 *
2147 */
2148 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2149 {
2150 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2151
2152 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2153 return -EINVAL;
2154 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2155 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2156 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2157 return 0;
2158 }
2159
2160 /**
2161 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2162 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2163 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2164 *
2165 */
2166 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2167 {
2168 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2169 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2170 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2171 }
2172
2173 /**
2174 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2175 * @len: data length in user space
2176 * @a: data address in kernel space
2177 *
2178 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2179 */
2180 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2181 {
2182 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2183
2184 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2185 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2186 if (!p)
2187 return -ENOMEM;
2188 context->sockaddr = p;
2189 }
2190
2191 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2192 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2193 return 0;
2194 }
2195
2196 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2197 {
2198 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2199
2200 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2201 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2202 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2203 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2204 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2205 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2206 }
2207
2208 /**
2209 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2210 * @sig: signal value
2211 * @t: task being signaled
2212 *
2213 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2214 * and uid that is doing that.
2215 */
2216 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2217 {
2218 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2219 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2220 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2221 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2222
2223 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2224 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2225 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2226 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2227 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2228 else
2229 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2230 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2231 }
2232 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235
2236 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2237 * in audit_context */
2238 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2239 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2240 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2241 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2242 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2243 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2244 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2245 return 0;
2246 }
2247
2248 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2249 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2250 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2251 if (!axp)
2252 return -ENOMEM;
2253
2254 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2255 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2256 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2257 }
2258 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2259
2260 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2261 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2262 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2263 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2264 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2265 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2266 axp->pid_count++;
2267
2268 return 0;
2269 }
2270
2271 /**
2272 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2273 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2274 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2275 * @old: the old credentials
2276 *
2277 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2278 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2279 *
2280 * -Eric
2281 */
2282 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2283 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2284 {
2285 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2286 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2287 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2288 struct dentry *dentry;
2289
2290 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2291 if (!ax)
2292 return -ENOMEM;
2293
2294 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2295 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2296 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2297
2298 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2299 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2300 dput(dentry);
2301
2302 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2303 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2304 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2305 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2306
2307 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2308 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2309 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2310
2311 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2312 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2313 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2314 return 0;
2315 }
2316
2317 /**
2318 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2319 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2320 * @new: the new credentials
2321 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2322 *
2323 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2324 * audit system if applicable
2325 */
2326 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2327 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2328 {
2329 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2330 context->capset.pid = pid;
2331 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2332 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2333 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2334 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2335 }
2336
2337 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2338 {
2339 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2340 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2341 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2342 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2343 }
2344
2345 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2346 {
2347 kuid_t auid, uid;
2348 kgid_t gid;
2349 unsigned int sessionid;
2350
2351 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2352 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2353 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2354
2355 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2356 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2357 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2358 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2359 sessionid);
2360 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2361 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2362 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2363 }
2364
2365 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2366 {
2367 audit_log_task(ab);
2368 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2369 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2370 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2371 }
2372 /**
2373 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2374 * @signr: signal value
2375 *
2376 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2377 * should record the event for investigation.
2378 */
2379 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2380 {
2381 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2382
2383 if (!audit_enabled)
2384 return;
2385
2386 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2387 return;
2388
2389 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2390 if (unlikely(!ab))
2391 return;
2392 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2393 audit_log_end(ab);
2394 }
2395
2396 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2397 {
2398 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2399
2400 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2401 if (unlikely(!ab))
2402 return;
2403 audit_log_task(ab);
2404 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2405 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2406 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2407 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2408 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2409 audit_log_end(ab);
2410 }
2411
2412 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2413 {
2414 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2415 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2416 return NULL;
2417 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2418 }
Linux with added FPC-III support