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framebuffer: fix border color
[linux/fpc-iii.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
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1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70
71 #include "audit.h"
72
73 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
74 * for saving names from getname(). */
75 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
76
77 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
78 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
79
80 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
81 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82
83 /* number of audit rules */
84 int audit_n_rules;
85
86 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
87 int audit_signals;
88
89 struct audit_cap_data {
90 kernel_cap_t permitted;
91 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
92 union {
93 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
94 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
95 };
96 };
97
98 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
99 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
100 * pointers at syscall exit time).
101 *
102 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
103 struct audit_names {
104 const char *name;
105 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
106 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
107 unsigned long ino;
108 dev_t dev;
109 umode_t mode;
110 uid_t uid;
111 gid_t gid;
112 dev_t rdev;
113 u32 osid;
114 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
115 unsigned int fcap_ver;
116 };
117
118 struct audit_aux_data {
119 struct audit_aux_data *next;
120 int type;
121 };
122
123 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
124
125 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
126 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
127
128 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
129 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 int argc;
131 int envc;
132 struct mm_struct *mm;
133 };
134
135 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
136 struct audit_aux_data d;
137 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
138 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
139 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
140 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
141 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
142 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
143 int pid_count;
144 };
145
146 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
147 struct audit_aux_data d;
148 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
149 unsigned int fcap_ver;
150 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
151 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
152 };
153
154 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
155 struct audit_aux_data d;
156 pid_t pid;
157 struct audit_cap_data cap;
158 };
159
160 struct audit_tree_refs {
161 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
162 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
163 };
164
165 /* The per-task audit context. */
166 struct audit_context {
167 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
168 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
169 enum audit_state state, current_state;
170 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
171 int major; /* syscall number */
172 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
173 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
174 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
175 u64 prio;
176 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
177 int name_count;
178 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
179 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
180 struct path pwd;
181 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
182 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
183 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
184 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
185 size_t sockaddr_len;
186 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
187 pid_t pid, ppid;
188 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
189 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
190 unsigned long personality;
191 int arch;
192
193 pid_t target_pid;
194 uid_t target_auid;
195 uid_t target_uid;
196 unsigned int target_sessionid;
197 u32 target_sid;
198 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
199
200 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
201 struct list_head killed_trees;
202 int tree_count;
203
204 int type;
205 union {
206 struct {
207 int nargs;
208 long args[6];
209 } socketcall;
210 struct {
211 uid_t uid;
212 gid_t gid;
213 mode_t mode;
214 u32 osid;
215 int has_perm;
216 uid_t perm_uid;
217 gid_t perm_gid;
218 mode_t perm_mode;
219 unsigned long qbytes;
220 } ipc;
221 struct {
222 mqd_t mqdes;
223 struct mq_attr mqstat;
224 } mq_getsetattr;
225 struct {
226 mqd_t mqdes;
227 int sigev_signo;
228 } mq_notify;
229 struct {
230 mqd_t mqdes;
231 size_t msg_len;
232 unsigned int msg_prio;
233 struct timespec abs_timeout;
234 } mq_sendrecv;
235 struct {
236 int oflag;
237 mode_t mode;
238 struct mq_attr attr;
239 } mq_open;
240 struct {
241 pid_t pid;
242 struct audit_cap_data cap;
243 } capset;
244 struct {
245 int fd;
246 int flags;
247 } mmap;
248 };
249 int fds[2];
250
251 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
252 int put_count;
253 int ino_count;
254 #endif
255 };
256
257 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
258 {
259 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
260 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
261 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
262 return n & mask;
263 }
264
265 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
266 {
267 unsigned n;
268 if (unlikely(!ctx))
269 return 0;
270 n = ctx->major;
271
272 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
273 case 0: /* native */
274 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
275 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
276 return 1;
277 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
278 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
279 return 1;
280 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
281 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
282 return 1;
283 return 0;
284 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
285 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
286 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
287 return 1;
288 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
289 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
290 return 1;
291 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
292 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
293 return 1;
294 return 0;
295 case 2: /* open */
296 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
297 case 3: /* openat */
298 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
299 case 4: /* socketcall */
300 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
301 case 5: /* execve */
302 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
303 default:
304 return 0;
305 }
306 }
307
308 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
309 {
310 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
311 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
312
313 if (unlikely(!ctx))
314 return 0;
315
316 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
317 return 0;
318 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
319 return 0;
320 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
321 return 0;
322 return 1;
323 }
324
325 /*
326 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
327 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
328 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
329 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
330 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
331 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
332 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
333 */
334
335 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
336 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
337 {
338 if (!ctx->prio) {
339 ctx->prio = 1;
340 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
341 }
342 }
343
344 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
345 {
346 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
347 int left = ctx->tree_count;
348 if (likely(left)) {
349 p->c[--left] = chunk;
350 ctx->tree_count = left;
351 return 1;
352 }
353 if (!p)
354 return 0;
355 p = p->next;
356 if (p) {
357 p->c[30] = chunk;
358 ctx->trees = p;
359 ctx->tree_count = 30;
360 return 1;
361 }
362 return 0;
363 }
364
365 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
366 {
367 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
368 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
369 if (!ctx->trees) {
370 ctx->trees = p;
371 return 0;
372 }
373 if (p)
374 p->next = ctx->trees;
375 else
376 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
377 ctx->tree_count = 31;
378 return 1;
379 }
380 #endif
381
382 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
383 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
384 {
385 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
386 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
387 int n;
388 if (!p) {
389 /* we started with empty chain */
390 p = ctx->first_trees;
391 count = 31;
392 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
393 if (!p)
394 return;
395 }
396 n = count;
397 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
398 while (n--) {
399 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
400 q->c[n] = NULL;
401 }
402 }
403 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
404 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
405 q->c[n] = NULL;
406 }
407 ctx->trees = p;
408 ctx->tree_count = count;
409 #endif
410 }
411
412 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
413 {
414 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
415 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
416 q = p->next;
417 kfree(p);
418 }
419 }
420
421 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
422 {
423 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
424 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
425 int n;
426 if (!tree)
427 return 0;
428 /* full ones */
429 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
430 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
431 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
432 return 1;
433 }
434 /* partial */
435 if (p) {
436 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
437 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
438 return 1;
439 }
440 #endif
441 return 0;
442 }
443
444 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
445 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
446 * otherwise.
447 *
448 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
449 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
450 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
451 */
452 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
453 struct audit_krule *rule,
454 struct audit_context *ctx,
455 struct audit_names *name,
456 enum audit_state *state,
457 bool task_creation)
458 {
459 const struct cred *cred;
460 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
461 u32 sid;
462
463 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
464
465 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
466 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
467 int result = 0;
468
469 switch (f->type) {
470 case AUDIT_PID:
471 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
472 break;
473 case AUDIT_PPID:
474 if (ctx) {
475 if (!ctx->ppid)
476 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
477 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
478 }
479 break;
480 case AUDIT_UID:
481 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
482 break;
483 case AUDIT_EUID:
484 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
485 break;
486 case AUDIT_SUID:
487 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
488 break;
489 case AUDIT_FSUID:
490 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
491 break;
492 case AUDIT_GID:
493 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
494 break;
495 case AUDIT_EGID:
496 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
497 break;
498 case AUDIT_SGID:
499 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
500 break;
501 case AUDIT_FSGID:
502 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
503 break;
504 case AUDIT_PERS:
505 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
506 break;
507 case AUDIT_ARCH:
508 if (ctx)
509 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
510 break;
511
512 case AUDIT_EXIT:
513 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
514 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
517 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
518 if (f->val)
519 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
520 else
521 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
522 }
523 break;
524 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
525 if (name)
526 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
527 f->op, f->val);
528 else if (ctx) {
529 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
530 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
531 ++result;
532 break;
533 }
534 }
535 }
536 break;
537 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
538 if (name)
539 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
540 f->op, f->val);
541 else if (ctx) {
542 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
543 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
544 ++result;
545 break;
546 }
547 }
548 }
549 break;
550 case AUDIT_INODE:
551 if (name)
552 result = (name->ino == f->val);
553 else if (ctx) {
554 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
555 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
556 ++result;
557 break;
558 }
559 }
560 }
561 break;
562 case AUDIT_WATCH:
563 if (name)
564 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
565 break;
566 case AUDIT_DIR:
567 if (ctx)
568 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
569 break;
570 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
571 result = 0;
572 if (ctx)
573 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
574 break;
575 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
576 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
577 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
578 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
579 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
580 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
581 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
582 match for now to avoid losing information that
583 may be wanted. An error message will also be
584 logged upon error */
585 if (f->lsm_rule) {
586 if (need_sid) {
587 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
588 need_sid = 0;
589 }
590 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
591 f->op,
592 f->lsm_rule,
593 ctx);
594 }
595 break;
596 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
597 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
598 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
599 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
600 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
601 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
602 also applies here */
603 if (f->lsm_rule) {
604 /* Find files that match */
605 if (name) {
606 result = security_audit_rule_match(
607 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
608 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
609 } else if (ctx) {
610 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
611 if (security_audit_rule_match(
612 ctx->names[j].osid,
613 f->type, f->op,
614 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
615 ++result;
616 break;
617 }
618 }
619 }
620 /* Find ipc objects that match */
621 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
622 break;
623 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
624 f->type, f->op,
625 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
626 ++result;
627 }
628 break;
629 case AUDIT_ARG0:
630 case AUDIT_ARG1:
631 case AUDIT_ARG2:
632 case AUDIT_ARG3:
633 if (ctx)
634 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
635 break;
636 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
637 /* ignore this field for filtering */
638 result = 1;
639 break;
640 case AUDIT_PERM:
641 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
642 break;
643 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
644 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
645 break;
646 }
647
648 if (!result)
649 return 0;
650 }
651
652 if (ctx) {
653 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
654 return 0;
655 if (rule->filterkey) {
656 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
657 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
658 }
659 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
660 }
661 switch (rule->action) {
662 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
663 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
664 }
665 return 1;
666 }
667
668 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
669 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
670 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
671 */
672 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
673 {
674 struct audit_entry *e;
675 enum audit_state state;
676
677 rcu_read_lock();
678 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
679 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
680 &state, true)) {
681 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
682 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
683 rcu_read_unlock();
684 return state;
685 }
686 }
687 rcu_read_unlock();
688 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
689 }
690
691 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
692 {
693 int word, bit;
694
695 if (val > 0xffffffff)
696 return false;
697
698 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
699 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
700 return false;
701
702 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
703
704 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
705 }
706
707 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
708 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
709 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
710 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
711 */
712 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
713 struct audit_context *ctx,
714 struct list_head *list)
715 {
716 struct audit_entry *e;
717 enum audit_state state;
718
719 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
720 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
721
722 rcu_read_lock();
723 if (!list_empty(list)) {
724 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
725 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
726 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
727 &state, false)) {
728 rcu_read_unlock();
729 ctx->current_state = state;
730 return state;
731 }
732 }
733 }
734 rcu_read_unlock();
735 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
736 }
737
738 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
739 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
740 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
741 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
742 */
743 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
744 {
745 int i;
746 struct audit_entry *e;
747 enum audit_state state;
748
749 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
750 return;
751
752 rcu_read_lock();
753 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
754 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
755 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
756 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
757
758 if (list_empty(list))
759 continue;
760
761 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
762 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
763 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n,
764 &state, false)) {
765 rcu_read_unlock();
766 ctx->current_state = state;
767 return;
768 }
769 }
770 }
771 rcu_read_unlock();
772 }
773
774 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
775 int return_valid,
776 long return_code)
777 {
778 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
779
780 if (likely(!context))
781 return NULL;
782 context->return_valid = return_valid;
783
784 /*
785 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
786 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
787 * signal handlers
788 *
789 * This is actually a test for:
790 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
791 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
792 *
793 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
794 */
795 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
796 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
797 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
798 context->return_code = -EINTR;
799 else
800 context->return_code = return_code;
801
802 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
803 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
804 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
805 }
806
807 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
808 return context;
809 }
810
811 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
812 {
813 int i;
814
815 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
816 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
817 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
818 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
819 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
820 __FILE__, __LINE__,
821 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
822 context->name_count, context->put_count,
823 context->ino_count);
824 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
825 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
826 context->names[i].name,
827 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
828 }
829 dump_stack();
830 return;
831 }
832 #endif
833 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
834 context->put_count = 0;
835 context->ino_count = 0;
836 #endif
837
838 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
839 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
840 __putname(context->names[i].name);
841 }
842 context->name_count = 0;
843 path_put(&context->pwd);
844 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
845 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
846 }
847
848 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
849 {
850 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
851
852 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
853 context->aux = aux->next;
854 kfree(aux);
855 }
856 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
857 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
858 kfree(aux);
859 }
860 }
861
862 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
863 enum audit_state state)
864 {
865 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
866 context->state = state;
867 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
868 }
869
870 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
871 {
872 struct audit_context *context;
873
874 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
875 return NULL;
876 audit_zero_context(context, state);
877 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
878 return context;
879 }
880
881 /**
882 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
883 * @tsk: task
884 *
885 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
886 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
887 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
888 * needed.
889 */
890 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
891 {
892 struct audit_context *context;
893 enum audit_state state;
894 char *key = NULL;
895
896 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
897 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
898
899 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
900 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
901 return 0;
902
903 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
904 kfree(key);
905 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
906 return -ENOMEM;
907 }
908 context->filterkey = key;
909
910 tsk->audit_context = context;
911 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
912 return 0;
913 }
914
915 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
916 {
917 struct audit_context *previous;
918 int count = 0;
919
920 do {
921 previous = context->previous;
922 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
923 ++count;
924 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
925 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
926 context->serial, context->major,
927 context->name_count, count);
928 }
929 audit_free_names(context);
930 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
931 free_tree_refs(context);
932 audit_free_aux(context);
933 kfree(context->filterkey);
934 kfree(context->sockaddr);
935 kfree(context);
936 context = previous;
937 } while (context);
938 if (count >= 10)
939 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
940 }
941
942 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
943 {
944 char *ctx = NULL;
945 unsigned len;
946 int error;
947 u32 sid;
948
949 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
950 if (!sid)
951 return;
952
953 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
954 if (error) {
955 if (error != -EINVAL)
956 goto error_path;
957 return;
958 }
959
960 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
961 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
962 return;
963
964 error_path:
965 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
966 return;
967 }
968
969 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
970
971 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
972 {
973 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
974 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
975 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
976
977 /* tsk == current */
978
979 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
980 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
981 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
982
983 if (mm) {
984 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
985 vma = mm->mmap;
986 while (vma) {
987 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
988 vma->vm_file) {
989 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
990 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
991 break;
992 }
993 vma = vma->vm_next;
994 }
995 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
996 }
997 audit_log_task_context(ab);
998 }
999
1000 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1001 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1002 u32 sid, char *comm)
1003 {
1004 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1005 char *ctx = NULL;
1006 u32 len;
1007 int rc = 0;
1008
1009 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1010 if (!ab)
1011 return rc;
1012
1013 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
1014 uid, sessionid);
1015 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1016 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1017 rc = 1;
1018 } else {
1019 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1020 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1021 }
1022 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1023 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1024 audit_log_end(ab);
1025
1026 return rc;
1027 }
1028
1029 /*
1030 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1031 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1032 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1033 *
1034 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1035 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1036 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1037 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1038 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1039 */
1040 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1041 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1042 int arg_num,
1043 size_t *len_sent,
1044 const char __user *p,
1045 char *buf)
1046 {
1047 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1048 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1049 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1050 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1051 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1052 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1053 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1054 int ret;
1055
1056 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1057 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1058
1059 /*
1060 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1061 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1062 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1063 * any.
1064 */
1065 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1066 WARN_ON(1);
1067 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1068 return -1;
1069 }
1070
1071 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1072 do {
1073 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1074 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1075 else
1076 to_send = len_left;
1077 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1078 /*
1079 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1080 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1081 * space yet.
1082 */
1083 if (ret) {
1084 WARN_ON(1);
1085 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1086 return -1;
1087 }
1088 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1089 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1090 if (has_cntl) {
1091 /*
1092 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1093 * send half as much in each message
1094 */
1095 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1096 break;
1097 }
1098 len_left -= to_send;
1099 tmp_p += to_send;
1100 } while (len_left > 0);
1101
1102 len_left = len;
1103
1104 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1105 too_long = 1;
1106
1107 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1108 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1109 int room_left;
1110
1111 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1112 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1113 else
1114 to_send = len_left;
1115
1116 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1117 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1118 if (has_cntl)
1119 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1120 else
1121 room_left -= to_send;
1122 if (room_left < 0) {
1123 *len_sent = 0;
1124 audit_log_end(*ab);
1125 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1126 if (!*ab)
1127 return 0;
1128 }
1129
1130 /*
1131 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1132 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1133 */
1134 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1135 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1136 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1137
1138 /*
1139 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1140 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1141 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1142 */
1143 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1144 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1145 else
1146 ret = 0;
1147 if (ret) {
1148 WARN_ON(1);
1149 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1150 return -1;
1151 }
1152 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1153
1154 /* actually log it */
1155 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1156 if (too_long)
1157 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1158 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1159 if (has_cntl)
1160 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1161 else
1162 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1163
1164 p += to_send;
1165 len_left -= to_send;
1166 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1167 if (has_cntl)
1168 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1169 else
1170 *len_sent += to_send;
1171 }
1172 /* include the null we didn't log */
1173 return len + 1;
1174 }
1175
1176 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1177 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1178 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1179 {
1180 int i;
1181 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1182 const char __user *p;
1183 char *buf;
1184
1185 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1186 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1187
1188 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1189
1190 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1191
1192 /*
1193 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1194 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1195 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1196 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1197 */
1198 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1199 if (!buf) {
1200 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1201 return;
1202 }
1203
1204 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1205 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1206 &len_sent, p, buf);
1207 if (len <= 0)
1208 break;
1209 p += len;
1210 }
1211 kfree(buf);
1212 }
1213
1214 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1215 {
1216 int i;
1217
1218 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1219 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1220 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1221 }
1222 }
1223
1224 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1225 {
1226 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1227 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1228 int log = 0;
1229
1230 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1231 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1232 log = 1;
1233 }
1234 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1235 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1236 log = 1;
1237 }
1238
1239 if (log)
1240 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1241 }
1242
1243 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1244 {
1245 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1246 int i;
1247
1248 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1249 if (!ab)
1250 return;
1251
1252 switch (context->type) {
1253 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1254 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1255 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1256 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1257 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1258 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1259 break; }
1260 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1261 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1262
1263 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1264 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1265 if (osid) {
1266 char *ctx = NULL;
1267 u32 len;
1268 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1269 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1270 *call_panic = 1;
1271 } else {
1272 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1273 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1274 }
1275 }
1276 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1277 audit_log_end(ab);
1278 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1279 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1280 audit_log_format(ab,
1281 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1282 context->ipc.qbytes,
1283 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1284 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1285 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1286 if (!ab)
1287 return;
1288 }
1289 break; }
1290 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1291 audit_log_format(ab,
1292 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1293 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1294 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1295 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1296 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1297 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1298 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1299 break; }
1300 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1301 audit_log_format(ab,
1302 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1303 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1304 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1305 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1306 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1307 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1308 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1309 break; }
1310 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1311 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1312 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1313 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1314 break; }
1315 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1316 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1317 audit_log_format(ab,
1318 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1319 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1320 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1321 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1322 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1323 break; }
1324 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1325 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1326 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1327 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1328 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1329 break; }
1330 case AUDIT_MMAP: {
1331 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1332 context->mmap.flags);
1333 break; }
1334 }
1335 audit_log_end(ab);
1336 }
1337
1338 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1339 {
1340 const struct cred *cred;
1341 int i, call_panic = 0;
1342 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1343 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1344 const char *tty;
1345
1346 /* tsk == current */
1347 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1348 if (!context->ppid)
1349 context->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
1350 cred = current_cred();
1351 context->uid = cred->uid;
1352 context->gid = cred->gid;
1353 context->euid = cred->euid;
1354 context->suid = cred->suid;
1355 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1356 context->egid = cred->egid;
1357 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1358 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1359 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1360
1361 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1362 if (!ab)
1363 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1364 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1365 context->arch, context->major);
1366 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1367 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1368 if (context->return_valid)
1369 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1370 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1371 context->return_code);
1372
1373 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1374 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1375 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1376 else
1377 tty = "(none)";
1378 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1379
1380 audit_log_format(ab,
1381 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1382 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1383 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1384 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1385 context->argv[0],
1386 context->argv[1],
1387 context->argv[2],
1388 context->argv[3],
1389 context->name_count,
1390 context->ppid,
1391 context->pid,
1392 tsk->loginuid,
1393 context->uid,
1394 context->gid,
1395 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1396 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1397 tsk->sessionid);
1398
1399
1400 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1401 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1402 audit_log_end(ab);
1403
1404 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1405
1406 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1407 if (!ab)
1408 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1409
1410 switch (aux->type) {
1411
1412 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1413 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1414 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1415 break; }
1416
1417 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1418 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1419 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1420 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1421 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1422 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1423 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1424 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1425 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1426 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1427 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1428 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1429 break; }
1430
1431 }
1432 audit_log_end(ab);
1433 }
1434
1435 if (context->type)
1436 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1437
1438 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1439 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1440 if (ab) {
1441 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1442 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1443 audit_log_end(ab);
1444 }
1445 }
1446
1447 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1448 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1449 if (ab) {
1450 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1451 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1452 context->sockaddr_len);
1453 audit_log_end(ab);
1454 }
1455 }
1456
1457 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1458 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1459
1460 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1461 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1462 axs->target_auid[i],
1463 axs->target_uid[i],
1464 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1465 axs->target_sid[i],
1466 axs->target_comm[i]))
1467 call_panic = 1;
1468 }
1469
1470 if (context->target_pid &&
1471 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1472 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1473 context->target_sessionid,
1474 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1475 call_panic = 1;
1476
1477 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1478 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1479 if (ab) {
1480 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1481 audit_log_end(ab);
1482 }
1483 }
1484 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1485 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1486
1487 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1488 if (!ab)
1489 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1490
1491 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1492
1493 if (n->name) {
1494 switch(n->name_len) {
1495 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1496 /* log the full path */
1497 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1498 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1499 break;
1500 case 0:
1501 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1502 * directory component is the cwd */
1503 audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
1504 break;
1505 default:
1506 /* log the name's directory component */
1507 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1508 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1509 n->name_len);
1510 }
1511 } else
1512 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1513
1514 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1515 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1516 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1517 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1518 n->ino,
1519 MAJOR(n->dev),
1520 MINOR(n->dev),
1521 n->mode,
1522 n->uid,
1523 n->gid,
1524 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1525 MINOR(n->rdev));
1526 }
1527 if (n->osid != 0) {
1528 char *ctx = NULL;
1529 u32 len;
1530 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1531 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1532 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1533 call_panic = 2;
1534 } else {
1535 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1536 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1537 }
1538 }
1539
1540 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1541
1542 audit_log_end(ab);
1543 }
1544
1545 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1546 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1547 if (ab)
1548 audit_log_end(ab);
1549 if (call_panic)
1550 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1551 }
1552
1553 /**
1554 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1555 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1556 *
1557 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1558 */
1559 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1560 {
1561 struct audit_context *context;
1562
1563 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1564 if (likely(!context))
1565 return;
1566
1567 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1568 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1569 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1570 * in the context of the idle thread */
1571 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1572 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1573 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1574 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1575 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1576
1577 audit_free_context(context);
1578 }
1579
1580 /**
1581 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1582 * @arch: architecture type
1583 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1584 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1585 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1586 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1587 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1588 *
1589 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1590 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1591 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1592 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1593 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1594 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1595 * be written).
1596 */
1597 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1598 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1599 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1600 {
1601 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1602 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1603 enum audit_state state;
1604
1605 if (unlikely(!context))
1606 return;
1607
1608 /*
1609 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1610 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1611 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1612 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1613 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1614 *
1615 * i386 no
1616 * x86_64 no
1617 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1618 *
1619 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1620 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1621 */
1622 if (context->in_syscall) {
1623 struct audit_context *newctx;
1624
1625 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1626 printk(KERN_ERR
1627 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1628 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1629 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1630 #endif
1631 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1632 if (newctx) {
1633 newctx->previous = context;
1634 context = newctx;
1635 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1636 } else {
1637 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1638 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1639 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1640 * to abandon auditing. */
1641 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1642 }
1643 }
1644 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1645
1646 if (!audit_enabled)
1647 return;
1648
1649 context->arch = arch;
1650 context->major = major;
1651 context->argv[0] = a1;
1652 context->argv[1] = a2;
1653 context->argv[2] = a3;
1654 context->argv[3] = a4;
1655
1656 state = context->state;
1657 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1658 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1659 context->prio = 0;
1660 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1661 }
1662 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1663 return;
1664
1665 context->serial = 0;
1666 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1667 context->in_syscall = 1;
1668 context->current_state = state;
1669 context->ppid = 0;
1670 }
1671
1672 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1673 {
1674 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1675 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
1676 if (!p || !ctx)
1677 return;
1678 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1679 return;
1680 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1681 p->major = ctx->major;
1682 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1683 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1684 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
1685 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1686 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1687 p->ppid = current->pid;
1688 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1689 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
1690 }
1691
1692 /**
1693 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1694 * @valid: success/failure flag
1695 * @return_code: syscall return value
1696 *
1697 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1698 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1699 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1700 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1701 * free the names stored from getname().
1702 */
1703 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1704 {
1705 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1706 struct audit_context *context;
1707
1708 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1709
1710 if (likely(!context))
1711 return;
1712
1713 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1714 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1715
1716 context->in_syscall = 0;
1717 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1718
1719 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1720 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1721
1722 if (context->previous) {
1723 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1724 context->previous = NULL;
1725 audit_free_context(context);
1726 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1727 } else {
1728 audit_free_names(context);
1729 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1730 audit_free_aux(context);
1731 context->aux = NULL;
1732 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1733 context->target_pid = 0;
1734 context->target_sid = 0;
1735 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1736 context->type = 0;
1737 context->fds[0] = -1;
1738 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1739 kfree(context->filterkey);
1740 context->filterkey = NULL;
1741 }
1742 tsk->audit_context = context;
1743 }
1744 }
1745
1746 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1747 {
1748 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1749 struct audit_context *context;
1750 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1751 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1752 int count;
1753 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1754 return;
1755 context = current->audit_context;
1756 p = context->trees;
1757 count = context->tree_count;
1758 rcu_read_lock();
1759 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1760 rcu_read_unlock();
1761 if (!chunk)
1762 return;
1763 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1764 return;
1765 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1766 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1767 audit_set_auditable(context);
1768 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1769 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1770 return;
1771 }
1772 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1773 #endif
1774 }
1775
1776 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1777 {
1778 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1779 struct audit_context *context;
1780 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1781 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1782 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1783 unsigned long seq;
1784 int count;
1785
1786 context = current->audit_context;
1787 p = context->trees;
1788 count = context->tree_count;
1789 retry:
1790 drop = NULL;
1791 d = dentry;
1792 rcu_read_lock();
1793 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1794 for(;;) {
1795 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1796 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1797 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1798 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1799 if (chunk) {
1800 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1801 drop = chunk;
1802 break;
1803 }
1804 }
1805 }
1806 parent = d->d_parent;
1807 if (parent == d)
1808 break;
1809 d = parent;
1810 }
1811 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1812 rcu_read_unlock();
1813 if (!drop) {
1814 /* just a race with rename */
1815 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1816 goto retry;
1817 }
1818 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1819 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1820 /* OK, got more space */
1821 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1822 goto retry;
1823 }
1824 /* too bad */
1825 printk(KERN_WARNING
1826 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1827 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1828 audit_set_auditable(context);
1829 return;
1830 }
1831 rcu_read_unlock();
1832 #endif
1833 }
1834
1835 /**
1836 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1837 * @name: name to add
1838 *
1839 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1840 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1841 */
1842 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1843 {
1844 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1845
1846 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1847 return;
1848
1849 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1850 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1851 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1852 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1853 dump_stack();
1854 #endif
1855 return;
1856 }
1857 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1858 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1859 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1860 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1861 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1862 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1863 ++context->name_count;
1864 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1865 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1866 }
1867
1868 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1869 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1870 *
1871 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1872 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1873 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1874 */
1875 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1876 {
1877 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1878
1879 BUG_ON(!context);
1880 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1881 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1882 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1883 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1884 if (context->name_count) {
1885 int i;
1886 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1887 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1888 context->names[i].name,
1889 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1890 }
1891 #endif
1892 __putname(name);
1893 }
1894 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1895 else {
1896 ++context->put_count;
1897 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1898 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1899 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1900 " put_count=%d\n",
1901 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1902 context->serial, context->major,
1903 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1904 context->put_count);
1905 dump_stack();
1906 }
1907 }
1908 #endif
1909 }
1910
1911 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1912 const struct inode *inode)
1913 {
1914 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1915 if (inode)
1916 printk(KERN_DEBUG "audit: name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1917 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1918 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1919 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1920 inode->i_ino);
1921
1922 else
1923 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1924 return 1;
1925 }
1926 context->name_count++;
1927 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1928 context->ino_count++;
1929 #endif
1930 return 0;
1931 }
1932
1933
1934 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1935 {
1936 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1937 int rc;
1938
1939 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1940 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1941 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1942 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1943
1944 if (!dentry)
1945 return 0;
1946
1947 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1948 if (rc)
1949 return rc;
1950
1951 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1952 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1953 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1954 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1955
1956 return 0;
1957 }
1958
1959
1960 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1961 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1962 const struct inode *inode)
1963 {
1964 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1965 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1966 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1967 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1968 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1969 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1970 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1971 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1972 }
1973
1974 /**
1975 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1976 * @name: name being audited
1977 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1978 *
1979 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1980 */
1981 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1982 {
1983 int idx;
1984 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1985 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1986
1987 if (!context->in_syscall)
1988 return;
1989 if (context->name_count
1990 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1991 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1992 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1993 else if (context->name_count > 1
1994 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1995 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1996 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1997 else {
1998 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1999 * associated name? */
2000 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2001 return;
2002 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2003 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2004 }
2005 handle_path(dentry);
2006 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
2007 }
2008
2009 /**
2010 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2011 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2012 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2013 *
2014 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2015 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2016 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2017 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2018 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2019 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2020 * unsuccessful attempts.
2021 */
2022 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
2023 const struct inode *parent)
2024 {
2025 int idx;
2026 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2027 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2028 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2029 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
2030 int dirlen = 0;
2031
2032 if (!context->in_syscall)
2033 return;
2034
2035 if (inode)
2036 handle_one(inode);
2037
2038 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2039 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2040 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2041
2042 if (!n->name)
2043 continue;
2044
2045 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2046 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2047 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2048 found_parent = n->name;
2049 goto add_names;
2050 }
2051 }
2052
2053 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2054 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2055 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2056
2057 if (!n->name)
2058 continue;
2059
2060 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2061 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2062 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2063 if (inode)
2064 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2065 else
2066 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2067 found_child = n->name;
2068 goto add_names;
2069 }
2070 }
2071
2072 add_names:
2073 if (!found_parent) {
2074 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2075 return;
2076 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2077 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2078 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2079 }
2080
2081 if (!found_child) {
2082 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2083 return;
2084 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2085
2086 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2087 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2088 * audit_free_names() */
2089 if (found_parent) {
2090 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2091 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2092 /* don't call __putname() */
2093 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2094 } else {
2095 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2096 }
2097
2098 if (inode)
2099 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2100 else
2101 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2102 }
2103 }
2104 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2105
2106 /**
2107 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2108 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2109 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2110 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2111 *
2112 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2113 */
2114 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2115 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2116 {
2117 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2118 return 0;
2119 if (!ctx->serial)
2120 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2121 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2122 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2123 *serial = ctx->serial;
2124 if (!ctx->prio) {
2125 ctx->prio = 1;
2126 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2127 }
2128 return 1;
2129 }
2130
2131 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2132 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2133
2134 /**
2135 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2136 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2137 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2138 *
2139 * Returns 0.
2140 *
2141 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2142 */
2143 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2144 {
2145 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2146 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2147
2148 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2149 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2150
2151 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2152 if (ab) {
2153 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2154 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2155 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2156 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2157 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2158 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2159 audit_log_end(ab);
2160 }
2161 }
2162 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2163 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2164 return 0;
2165 }
2166
2167 /**
2168 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2169 * @oflag: open flag
2170 * @mode: mode bits
2171 * @attr: queue attributes
2172 *
2173 */
2174 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2175 {
2176 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2177
2178 if (attr)
2179 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2180 else
2181 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2182
2183 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2184 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2185
2186 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2187 }
2188
2189 /**
2190 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2191 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2192 * @msg_len: Message length
2193 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2194 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2195 *
2196 */
2197 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2198 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2199 {
2200 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2201 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2202
2203 if (abs_timeout)
2204 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2205 else
2206 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2207
2208 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2209 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2210 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2211
2212 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2213 }
2214
2215 /**
2216 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2217 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2218 * @notification: Notification event
2219 *
2220 */
2221
2222 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2223 {
2224 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2225
2226 if (notification)
2227 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2228 else
2229 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2230
2231 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2232 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2233 }
2234
2235 /**
2236 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2237 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2238 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2239 *
2240 */
2241 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2242 {
2243 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2244 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2245 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2246 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2247 }
2248
2249 /**
2250 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2251 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2252 *
2253 */
2254 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2255 {
2256 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2257 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2258 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2259 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2260 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2261 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2262 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2263 }
2264
2265 /**
2266 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2267 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2268 * @uid: msgq user id
2269 * @gid: msgq group id
2270 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2271 *
2272 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2273 */
2274 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2275 {
2276 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2277
2278 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2279 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2280 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2281 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2282 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2283 }
2284
2285 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2286 {
2287 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2288 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2289
2290 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2291 return 0;
2292
2293 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2294 if (!ax)
2295 return -ENOMEM;
2296
2297 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2298 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2299 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2300 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2301 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2302 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2303 return 0;
2304 }
2305
2306
2307 /**
2308 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2309 * @nargs: number of args
2310 * @args: args array
2311 *
2312 */
2313 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2314 {
2315 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2316
2317 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2318 return;
2319
2320 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2321 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2322 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2323 }
2324
2325 /**
2326 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2327 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2328 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2329 *
2330 */
2331 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2332 {
2333 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2334 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2335 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2336 }
2337
2338 /**
2339 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2340 * @len: data length in user space
2341 * @a: data address in kernel space
2342 *
2343 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2344 */
2345 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2346 {
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2348
2349 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2350 return 0;
2351
2352 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2353 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2354 if (!p)
2355 return -ENOMEM;
2356 context->sockaddr = p;
2357 }
2358
2359 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2360 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2361 return 0;
2362 }
2363
2364 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2365 {
2366 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2367
2368 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2369 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2370 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2371 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2372 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2373 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2374 }
2375
2376 /**
2377 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2378 * @sig: signal value
2379 * @t: task being signaled
2380 *
2381 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2382 * and uid that is doing that.
2383 */
2384 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2385 {
2386 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2387 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2388 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2389 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2390
2391 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2392 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2393 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2394 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2395 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2396 else
2397 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2398 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2399 }
2400 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2401 return 0;
2402 }
2403
2404 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2405 * in audit_context */
2406 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2407 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2408 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2409 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2410 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2411 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2412 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2413 return 0;
2414 }
2415
2416 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2417 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2418 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2419 if (!axp)
2420 return -ENOMEM;
2421
2422 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2423 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2424 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2425 }
2426 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2427
2428 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2429 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2430 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2431 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2432 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2433 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2434 axp->pid_count++;
2435
2436 return 0;
2437 }
2438
2439 /**
2440 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2441 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2442 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2443 * @old: the old credentials
2444 *
2445 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2446 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2447 *
2448 * -Eric
2449 */
2450 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2451 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2452 {
2453 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2454 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2455 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2456 struct dentry *dentry;
2457
2458 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2459 if (!ax)
2460 return -ENOMEM;
2461
2462 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2463 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2464 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2465
2466 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2467 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2468 dput(dentry);
2469
2470 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2471 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2472 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2473 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2474
2475 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2476 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2477 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2478
2479 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2480 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2481 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2482 return 0;
2483 }
2484
2485 /**
2486 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2487 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2488 * @new: the new credentials
2489 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2490 *
2491 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2492 * audit system if applicable
2493 */
2494 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2495 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2496 {
2497 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2498 context->capset.pid = pid;
2499 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2500 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2501 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2502 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2503 }
2504
2505 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2506 {
2507 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2508 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2509 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2510 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2511 }
2512
2513 /**
2514 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2515 * @signr: signal value
2516 *
2517 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2518 * should record the event for investigation.
2519 */
2520 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2521 {
2522 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2523 u32 sid;
2524 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2525 gid_t gid;
2526 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2527
2528 if (!audit_enabled)
2529 return;
2530
2531 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2532 return;
2533
2534 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2535 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2536 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2537 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2538 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2539 if (sid) {
2540 char *ctx = NULL;
2541 u32 len;
2542
2543 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2544 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2545 else {
2546 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2547 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2548 }
2549 }
2550 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2551 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2552 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2553 audit_log_end(ab);
2554 }
2555
2556 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2557 {
2558 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2559 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2560 return NULL;
2561 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2562 }
Linux with added FPC-III support